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Preface 
This evaluation was commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Ministry of Southern Area 
Development, Government of Sri Lanka, to summarise the main experiences 
and lessons from twenty years of cooperation in the Hambantota District. The 
study focuses primarily on the third and last phase of the Hambantota 
Integrated Rural Development Programme ending in 1999.    
 
The team consisted of: 
?  Mr. Alf Morten Jerve, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway, team leader 
?  Prof. Marcus M. Karunanayake, Department of Geography, University 
of Sri Jayewardenepura, Sri Lanka 
?  Dr. Sylvi Endresen, Department of Sociology and Human Geography, 
University of Oslo, Norway 
?  Dr. Dhanawardana Gamage, Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research 
and Training Institute, Sri Lanka   
 
This report is the collective effort of the whole team in which the outline, 
drafts of chapters and the main conclusions have been developed in a series of 
team meetings and subsequent e-mail communication. Karunanayake and 
Gamage are the main authors of the contextual analysis (chapters 2.1 and 3.1 
respectively), while Jerve and Endresen drafted the programme specific 
chapters (2.2/2.3 and 3.2/3.3 respectively) with inputs from Karunanayake 
and Gamage. Jerve drafted the introductory and concluding chapters. 
 
This study would not have been possible without the professional and 
managerial assistance from the Development Studies Institute, University of 
Colombo. A major part of its assignment was the commissioning of three 
background studies (see list of references) conducted by: 
?  Prof. D. Atapattu, Department of Economics, University of Ruhuna 
?  Prof. W.D. Lakshman, Department of Economics, University of 
Colombo 
?  Prof. B. Hewavitharana 
 
In particular, the team wishes to acknowledge the support provided by W. 
Gooneratne and G. Wickremasinghe of the Development Studies Institute, P.S.  
Gajanayke (District Director, REAP, Hambantota), P.P.G. Sirepala (Social 
Mobiliser Foundation) and A. Thassim (Hambantota District Chamber of 
Commerce) for facilitating the fieldwork programme.  Last but not least we 
thank the many people who shared important information and insights with 
the team. While we hope that their views are reflected in the way we have 
formulated lessons from HIRDEP, some will no doubt take issue with some of 
the conclusions, for which the team alone is responsible. 
 
Alf Morten Jerve, Bergen, Norway, January 2003  
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1 HIRDEP in the 1990s: how to phase out aid 
in a changing environment   
Development aid is intended to be a temporary measure. It should function as 
a booster to a society, an economy, an organisation or a household, not as a 
permanent feature. Aid has been successful when it is no longer needed. This 
is our common perception, but we all too often see how aid breeds 
dependency, and how both donors and recipients have difficulties preparing 
for termination of the relationship. There is no easy formula for phasing out 
aid, and this is inherently more difficult to do well than the opposite – phasing 
in aid. This study looks at a case of planned phasing-out. From 1992 to 1999 
the Hambantota Integrated Rural Development Programme (HIRDEP) 
prepared for the termination of Norwegian funding.  
 
We look at the lessons from the phasing-out of HIRDEP under two broad 
headings. The first theme relates to the core agenda during HIRDEP’s first ten 
years, namely to build a more responsive public sector. How could the 
achievements of HIRDEP in this respect be sustained within a changing 
government structure? The second theme relates to the agenda of liberalising 
economic policies and changing the role of the state, which had become firmly 
entrenched in Sri Lankan politics by the time HIRDEP entered its last phase. 
How could HIRDEP more effectively contribute to the new policy of 
strengthening the economic growth of the district? In particular, how could 
HIRDEP promote sustainable institutions able to create new economic 
opportunities for the poor?  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 present these two themes. Both chapters start with an 
analysis of the context within which HIRDEP operated. It is not possible to 
understand the successes and failures of the programme without referring to 
the broader picture which, most importantly, includes the effects of the 
escalating civil war, the effects of liberalisation, a faltering devolution process, 
and environmental stress and drought. But first a few words are warranted 
about the HIRDEP legacy leading up to the phasing-out.    
 
When the governments of Sri Lanka and Norway started consultations in 
1977 about promoting rural development in the south of the country, they 
shared the vision of  “achieving an increase in income, employment and 
production as well as improvement of social conditions and living standards 
…. with special emphasis on the poorest and disadvantaged groups”, as it was 
formulated when the Agreement for HIRDEP was signed in 1979. However, 
the two parties had no clear and common strategy for achieving this broad 
objective. Some advocated targeting key sectors, others a multi-sectoral 
programme, and there were diverging opinions on the need for comprehensive 
long-term planning as opposed to a more iterative process planning approach. 
This led to a compromise, not so much by design as a response to the weak 
institutional capacity of the district. It was accepted that ‘learning by doing’ 
had to be the way forward, guided by the following operational principles: 
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? Building a self-reliant planning capability of the district that,  
? by using a recurrent, revolving planning process within an annual cycle, 
would facilitate 
? integration of efforts in different fields and sectors, and 
? ensure the involvement of beneficiaries in planning and implementation. 
 
A “trademark” of HIRDEP, which gained substantial recognition within Sri 
Lanka as well as with the donor itself, was the capacity for innovation which 
gradually evolved. This had been greatly facilitated by the flexible system of 
planning and a dedicated team of programme staff wielding considerable 
influence over district-based public and private institutions.  
 
Norway’s funding of HIRDEP came to a close in 1999, and this effectively 
terminated the programme, ending a twenty-year period during which 
HIRDEP reached its financial peak in 1991 (Figure 1). According to HIRDEP 
sources, the programme had contributed as much as 70 percent of public 
sector investments in this period, and it had experimented with a broad range 
of development approaches. NORAD announced its decision to phase out its 
support seven years earlier, at the Annual Meeting in 1992. It was motivated 
by a general trend in aid to limit donors’ engagement at project level, a 
growing scepticism towards the effectiveness of integrated projects – 
integrated rural development projects (IRDPs) – which had been brewing for 
some time internationally, and a view that phasing-out aid in itself is healthy 
and can be a means to promote sustainable development. Contrary to what 
has been the case with many similar projects, like other IRDPs in Sri Lanka as 
well as NORAD-funded IRDPs in Tanzania, HIRDEP was given ample time to 
prepare and implement a phasing-out strategy.  
 
A team appointed by the Regional Development Division of the Ministry of 
Policy, Planning and Implementation (MPPI) formulated, in 1992, principles 
for the phasing-out (Amarasinghe et al nd). Subsequently, the objectives of 
HIRDEP were reformulated based partly on recommendations from an 
evaluation of the programme in 1991 (Jerve et al 1992). Besides offering 
guidelines on how to adapt to a gradual reduction in NORAD-funding, the 
main concern of the team was to ensure that the qualities of HIRDEP in 
development planning and management could be sustained. “HIRDEP should 
be able to develop a model and practice for HIRDEP to be integrated with the 
new institutions and the gradual disappearance of its prominence as a separate 
project” (Amarasinghe et al nd:65). The vision was to institutionalise the 
HIRDEP way of working within the new structure of provincial governance 
and devolution of authority to divisions that had been introduced in 1987.  
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Figure 1: HIRDEP expenditures 1979-99 (current value)
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It is a commonly held view that HIRDEP, or “NORAD” as the project came 
to be known locally, contributed significantly to the development of the 
Hambantota District, now part of the Southern Province. Its population has 
experienced major developmental improvements over the years, but also some 
dramatic setbacks with the JVP uprising in 1987-88 and the current drought 
(2000-02). We argue that it is not possible to determine in any exact way the 
role and contribution of HIRDEP to this development, but that there is 
substantial evidence of positive impacts from HIRDEP, as several studies have 
documented.   
 
Most significantly, HIRDEP has been the main financier and supervisor of 
successful efforts to improve the quality and accessibility of public sector 
infrastructure, such as in education, health and sanitation, drinking water 
supply, irrigation, roads, and postal services. It is of major significance that 
HIRDEP facilitated the expansion of services to less developed parts of the 
district. It boosted the institutional capacity of a broad range of public sector 
agencies, including, quite importantly, technical extension services in 
agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry and small-scale industry, and 
production statistics bear witness to a positive impact. The broader 
institutional effects on development planning and management are less 
tangible, but not less significant. There is evidence that HIRDEP improved 
public agencies’ responsiveness through individual training, a commitment to 
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participatory approaches, and improved work ethics. Needless to say, this 
capacity is vulnerable and much has withered with the decline in foreign aid 
and the financial crisis of government.  At an individual level, however, it 
continues to influence the career and work of many civil servants, although 
many are no longer in Hambantota.  
 
Where HIRDEP probably has had a more lasting impact is in the mobilisation 
of people’s organisations. This is now often referred to as increased social 
capital. The growth of local NGOs and community-based organisations 
(CBOs) in the district has been formidable and HIRDEP was a major player in 
stimulating this process. The savings and credit programme for poor people 
started by HIRDEP (today the Social Mobilisation Foundation) now organises 
17,000 members.  
 
Finally, there has also been an impact on private sector development. Again, 
one should emphasise institutional factors more than conventional measures 
of economic growth. The local private sector is still in a formative stage and 
no big enterprises have emerged, but in terms of networking and organisation 
there have been fundamental changes since the late 1970s. The role of 
HIRDEP has been most visible in the support to the establishment of the 
Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce and several local trade 
associations. Not only is the Chamber regarded Sri Lanka’s best functioning 
district chamber, but in more general terms the old image of Hambantota as 
an isolated, underdeveloped and unattractive location for investment is about 
to change. In today’s open economy this is a major asset, which HIRDEP can 
take some credit for building up. 
 
Of equal significance, and probably more articulated, has been the interest 
that has been created around the ways in which the programme operated. The 
term integrated rural development has no authoritative definition. Projects and 
programmes bearing this label have in common a framework for multi-
sectoral interventions, but differ considerably in terms of approaches to 
planning, financing mechanisms, territorial delimitations, and decision-making 
procedures. With HIRDEP, the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and 
NORAD tried out a concept based on a flexible annual revolving planning 
process, extensive use of participatory methods, and mobilising existing public 
sector agencies.  
 
The evaluation of 1991 concluded “that the innovative capacity of HIRDEP 
stands out as its main organisational achievement”. “The Planning Unit 
became a local “centre of excellence”, think tank, catalyst and efficient 
planning machinery” (Jerve et al 1992:xv). By the early 1990s HIRDEP’s 
innovations had been most remarkable within the area of community or 
village level development, through experiments with integrated planning, 
peoples’ participation and social mobilisation.  
 
In what ways did the Planning Unit carry forward and benefit from these 
faculties? Was it equally innovative in the phasing-out period?  The authors of 
the phasing-out strategy asked in 1992 the rhetorical question: “What should 
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the phasing out mean? Is it simply continuation of the same activities as 
before, but scaling them down?” Clearly not. 
 
HIRDEP should become more outward and future orientated, 
divert an increasing proportion of its resources towards 
experimentation in problem solving and playing a more active 
role in supporting and shaping the future of the rural 
development, in the years after NORAD assistance has been 
withdrawn. (Amarasinghe et al nd:1) 
 
Although it is not possible to distil from the phasing-out strategy document 
clear operational guidelines, it is worth noting that a distinction between 
HIRDEP’s institutional and developmental role is made. The former refers to 
approaches to planning, and institutional development or strengthening, while 
the latter refers to HIRDEP’s investments in social and economic 
infrastructure. The balance of investments, according to Amarasinghe et al, 
should gradually move in favour of the former. This would imply the 
following: 
 
? A scaling down of projects involving major new asset creation. 
? Handing over of HIRDEP functions in implementation, monitoring and 
financial management to other institutions. 
? Improving the systems for operations and maintenance in recipient 
institutions, including funding of recurrent expenditures. 
? Transferring of HIRDEP’s planning process to other agencies – i.e. the 
Provincial Council, divisional secretaries, Pradeshiya Sabha and line 
agencies. 
? Increasing efforts in innovation and experimentation with a focus on  
o creating self-sustaining people’s organisations with a capacity to 
take greater financial and organisational responsibility for public 
infrastructure; and 
o introducing new entry points for income generation and 
employment creation. 
 
The main objective of this study is to identify lessons learned in pursuing these 
various strategies that might be relevant for future efforts in stimulating rural 
and regional development in Sri Lanka. Lessons from HIRDEP ought to be 
considered carefully by those who design rehabilitation and reconstruction 
programmes for war-torn districts in the north and east of the country. 
 
We have identified four main challenges facing HIRDEP when it started its 
move towards the closure of the programme, and we have organised our 
analysis accordingly: 
 
1. How to build up the capacity of the divisional level in development 
planning and management? 
2. How to ensure that investments in social and economic infrastructure will 
be effectively utilised and maintained? 
C M I  
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3. How to promote employment creation more effectively through private 
sector development? 
4. How to sustain people’s organisations that strengthen poor people’s 
capabilities for income generation? 
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2 Building a more responsive public sector 
At the core of HIRDEP’s mission to enhance the quality of life of the common 
woman and man in Hambantota District has been an effort to make public 
institutions more effective and more responsive. Following the local 
government reform of 1987 HIRDEP envisioned the new divisions as the 
lynchpin in this effort. In chapter 2.2 we explore the lessons learned. 
Following the decision to phase out, HIRDEP’s attention was drawn to the 
problem of the sustainability of its investments. In chapter 2.3 we assess the 
achievements made. It needs to be underlined, however, that the success or 
failure of HIRDEP in these regards has been strongly influenced by national 
and more importantly regional and local political processes, and we start this 
section at that end.  
2.1 Situating HIRDEP in the political context of 
Hambantota District  
We shall situate HIRDEP in the context of three dominant political processes: 
the ethnic conflict and the formation of new provinces; the JVP revolt and the 
quest for devolution; and the economic crisis and liberalisation. While the 
emphasis is on the 1990s the analysis will go back in time when necessary for 
a clearer understanding of the processes involved, as well as to place the recent 
developments in context. 
The starting point: a good fit for HIRDEP 
The time period of HIRDEP, from 1979 to 1999, coincides with a series of 
public administration reforms responding to various social and political 
pressures, none of them given time and resources to mature properly, and 
leaving behind an increasingly complex and inefficient system of sub-national 
governance. In its initial years, however, HIRDEP was comfortably situated 
within the realm of the district authority. 
 
When HIRDEP was set up Sri Lanka was still under a system of 
administration dominated from the centre. The district was at the hub of the 
country’s structure of regional administration. Many (but not all) line 
ministries were represented at this level, but in a vertical structure with lines of 
command directly from Colombo. The District administration, headed by the 
Government Agent (GA), was mainly a coordinating body. In 1981 a District 
Development Council (DDC) was instituted to assist the GA in this function. 
Independent sources of revenue under the GA’s purview were limited, but 
since 1974 he had been administering the so-called decentralized capital 
budget (DCB) on behalf of the District’s four Members of Parliament.  
 
At the outset, the new IRDPs of Sri Lanka were viewed as a resource transfer 
to underserved districts, mainly in the form of centrally planned sector 
programmes (Gunatilaka and Williams 1999). Confronted with a generally 
very weak implementation capacity and facing burgeoning coordination 
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problems, the strategy adopted by HIRDEP was to reinforce the district 
administration via the District Planning Unit (DPU). HIRDEP made the DPU 
the lead agency for the implementation of its activities, and as a special 
provision for Hambantota, the Ministry of Policy, Planning and 
Implementation combined the position of Director DPU and Project Director 
HIRDEP in one and the same individual. In this way, HIRDEP contributed 
substantially to district level decentralisation. It represented a de facto 
deconcentration of administrative powers to the district by virtue of the 
financial clout of the programme and the flexible project approval process 
adopted by NORAD (i.e. annual revolving planning); but, importantly, this 
had no corresponding relationship with a process of political devolution. The 
DDC was highly ineffective and lost its momentum not long after its 
establishment (Gunatilaka and Williams 1999).  
 
In 1982 Government attempted to achieve some further degree of 
decentralisation and reach the grassroots through the creation of the 
Pradeshiya Mandalaya (divisional committee) and the Gramodaya Mandalaya 
(covering a cluster of villages) (Karunanayake and Herath 2002).1 The 
Gramodaya Mandalayas (GMs) comprised chairmen of community and 
voluntary organisations at the village level such as Rural Development 
Societies, Cooperative Societies, and Death Donation Societies. In addition, 
frontline government officials were represented in an ex-officio capacity. The 
government officers were debarred from holding office or voting at meetings 
of the GM. The Chairman of the GM was made an ex-officio member of the 
Pradeshiya Mandalaya.  
 
In its first local-level development projects HIRDEP successfully managed to 
mobilise the GM, and even went as far as making it an implementing body for 
small village-level infrastructure projects, such as wells. The HIRDEP Project 
Director was later reprimanded by the Auditor General for advancing money 
to the GMs, as they were not authorised to manage imprest accounts. From a 
financial and efficiency point of view, however, this was a remarkable success. 
GMs were able to get work done both faster and much cheaper than the 
relevant line agency. But in terms of improving the lives of the poorest it was 
not a success.  
 
The institution of the GM offered HIRDEP a mechanism that would enable it 
to plan closer to the people. However, it did not take long for HIRDEP to 
realize that working through the GMs was counterproductive mainly owing to 
two reasons. First, almost all persons who were selected as chairmen of GMs 
were from the ruling party. Hence, the GMs were sympathetic to the ruling 
party. This in turn meant that the GMs were easily converted to the position 
of institutions dispensing political patronage. Secondly, by the very manner in 
which they were constituted GMs assumed the position of an elite 
organisation that was not inclined to serve the interests of the poor. It was 
soon evident that this approach belied the expectations of HIRDEP in that the 
poor were very much marginalized from the development process. 
 
                                                 
1 The Gramodaya Mandalaya Act, No. 28 of 1982. 
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HIRDEP had at the time only a very tenuous relationship with the divisional 
level and the new Pradeshiya Mandalayas. In the first local-level projects, such 
as in Katuwana, the Planning Unit directly managed the work. There was little 
political commitment to see that the Pradeshiya Mandalayas prospered. And 
they became short-lived.   
The new provincial set-up: HIRDEP’s platform withers 
With the enactment of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in 1987, 
primarily as a response to the demand for political autonomy by the Tamil 
community spearheaded by the LTTE, the stage was set for the transition from 
decentralisation to devolution. This led to the creation of Provincial Councils 
(PCs).2 The provinces were given the vestiges of self-governance, but in 
financial as well as political terms the central government has been reluctant 
to make a serious stride towards a federal state. A future peace agreement 
with LTTE may as well lead to a complete redrafting of the 1987 map.  
 
Members of PCs are elected at a general election for a five-year term, but the 
Governor of the Province, who is also the chief executive of the PC, is 
appointed by the President. The Governor in turn appoints the Chief Minister 
of the provincial cabinet, together with four other ministers. The President 
also appoints the Chief Secretary heading the administrative machinery of the 
PC on the advice of the Chief Minister.   
 
The Act stipulates subjects over which the PC has exclusive control, and 
integrated rural development is on that list of devolved subjects. There is also 
a list of concurrent subjects over which there is shared responsibility between 
the centre and the provincial administration. There is, however, much 
ambiguity in regard to the items listed in the Concurrent List, and the PCs 
have not been able to exercise the powers of devolved governance in adequate 
measure. In this regard the Southern Provincial Council is no exception.  
 
The high degree of dependence on the central government for funds limits the 
exercise of political autonomy at provincial level. Furthermore, the powers 
vested in the President impose restrictions on the exercise of power by the PC. 
The position of the PC is particularly constrained when the head of 
government and the PC have different political affiliations. The Southern 
Provincial Council finds itself in this position at present. 
 
As a result of HIRDEP coming under the PC it found itself in the anomalous 
situation of no longer being a district-based organisation. As a result HIRDEP 
had to sit uncomfortably in the middle of the Province-Division line of 
authority (Amarasinghe et al. nd). The lines of authority that HIRDEP had to 
follow were found to be overlapping and confusing. It continued to be part of 
the national Integrated Rural Development Programme. This meant that 
disbursements continued to be made by the Ministry of Policy, Planning and 
Implementation (MPPI) through the Southern Provincial Council. The 
Regional Development Division (RDD) of the Ministry was placed in an 
                                                 
2 The Provincial Councils Act, No. 42 of 1987. 
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advisory and a technical backstopping capacity. The negotiations with donors 
and monitoring of projects were deemed to be the responsibility of the MPPI. 
The general situation that the IRDPs had to contend with in the provincial 
administration set-up (which is equally valid in the case of HIRDEP) is 
expressed by Gunatilaka and Williams (1998) in the following terms: 
 
While the Provincial Council now maintained formal control 
over the IRDP Project Office, the latter had to report back to the 
District Planning Secretariat, which however was powerless to 
influence the activities of the Project Office. At the same time, 
there was no link whatsoever between the District Planning 
Secretariat and the Planning Office of the Provincial Council. 
The confused lines of authority meant that the Rural 
Development Division at the Centre … remained in de facto 
control and continued to manage the programme. 
 
The changed circumstances had important policy and operational implications 
for HIRDEP.  Regional planning within a provincial spatial framework never 
got off the ground despite the setting up of a Provincial Planning Unit. Indeed 
provincial planning meant no more than the bringing together of various work 
programmes prepared by the provincial sectoral ministries for implementation. 
This did not provide much space for HIRDEP to be part of the provincial 
planning process.  
 
The elimination of the district as the unit of planning meant that the 
integration which HIRDEP had achieved with the district administration, 
which was still responsible for coordinating the activities of the line ministries 
of the central government, was no longer possible. The separation of the 
position of the Project Director HIRDEP from that of Director DPU meant 
that the type of authority that the Project Director exercised through the GA 
over line departments was greatly diluted although some influence was still 
possible because, in a resource-scarce environment, the line departments were 
dependent on HIRDEP as a supplementary source of funding for the 
implementation of their projects. 
 
The civil war in the North and the East broke out in 1983 and by the time the 
HIRDEP phasing out commenced Sri Lanka was deeply into this war. A 
consequence was that the line departments were operating under severe 
financial stress. This meant that HIRDEP came to be regarded as a general 
development agency for the district. This not only placed a strain on HIRDEP 
on the organisational front, but also made it spread its resources thinly across 
the district. A positive development was that in the case of projects initiated by 
the line departments implementation was through them, enabling a degree of 
institutional integration. But when this was not possible HIRDEP itself had to 
take on the responsibility of project implementation, which was quite contrary 
to its policy of institutional strengthening. This also meant that the line 
departments came to be over-dependent on HIRDEP for funds and project 
implementation, a situation that has had implications for sustainability. 
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The new local government: a weak partner for HIRDEP   
A lacuna in the decentralised system of governance was the failure to 
accommodate the political aspirations and energy of a new generation of 
young people from non-elite families. Experiencing the limitations of the GMs, 
already by 1984 HIRDEP was seen to be basing its activities on target groups 
involving the poor through a process of social mobilisation. This was a 
process that was greatly facilitated by the formation of a cadre of social 
mobilisers.  
 
When the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) took up arms against the 
state in 1987 the members of GMs who represented the ruling party were 
identified as prime targets mainly because of the discriminatory politics that 
they had practised for the benefit of their supporters, as well as for their own 
benefit. The GMs ceased to function after 1987. The uprising was a result of 
the radicalising of the youth constituency in Sri Lanka (in areas other than in 
the North and the East where the LTTE was waging the secessionist war). 
Hambantota was a hotbed of the revolt against the establishment. The JVP 
movement targeted public buildings and physical infrastructure facilities for 
attack to disrupt government activity. 
 
The JVP was hostile to the type of social mobilisation and the resulting forms 
of grassroots development programmes implemented by HIRDEP and NGOs 
such as Sarvodaya. In its view, HIRDEP as much as the NGOs was only 
helping to sustain the status quo to prevent a radical structural transformation 
of rural society. The JVP uprising had an impact on HIRDEP activities. There 
was little direct damage inflicted on HIRDEP-financed buildings and 
infrastructure (except for the Bedigama sericulture project, which was 
destroyed by fire), but activities in the interior parts of the district were held in 
abeyance for about three years. The JVP’s activities did not cause HIRDEP to 
change its social mobilisation strategy, but HIRDEP was alerted to its 
limitations in inducing economic transformation. This realisation found 
expression in the emphasis given to economic mobilisation of the poor in the 
phasing-out strategy. 
 
A significant concurrent development was the announcement in 1987 of a 
genuinely devolved local government at the divisional level – the Pradeshiya 
Sabha (PS). This was clearly a response to growing popular discontent with 
elitist politics, which had its most radical expression in the JVP movement. 
The model adopted was linked to and greatly facilitated by the provincial 
reform. The PS replaced the Pradeshiya Mandalaya with the objective, as 
stated in the Act, to “provide greater opportunities for the people to 
participate effectively in decision making process relating to administration 
and development activities at the local level” (our emphasis).3 The chief 
executive of the Pradeshiya Sabha is the Chairman elected by the membership. 
It has the power to make by-laws and levy taxes.  
 
                                                 
3 The Pradeshiya Sabha Act, No. 15 of 1987. 
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The PS has been given wide-ranging powers to take development to the 
people. In addition to the more conventional local government functions the 
PS is also responsible for a host of other functions that allows it to: 
 
Spend any part of the Pradeshiya Sabha Fund in promoting rural 
women’s development activities, integrated development of 
selected villages, community development projects, and in 
making grants to rural development projects, Gramodaya 
Mandalayas and rural development organizations qualified to be 
represented on Gramodaya Mandalayas. 
 
Although the new local government was empowered to undertake planning at 
the divisional level, in practice most development planning activities were 
undertaken by the Divisional Secretariat. This had implications for HIRDEP 
as a development agency. There was no real attempt made by the centre or the 
Province to empower the PS, and the responsibility for local-level planning 
and implementation of development programmes in the rural areas fell on the 
better resourced Divisional Secretariats, while administration of urban and 
town affairs was considered the responsibility of the PS. Hence, at the 
divisional level a dual structure emerged, with the Divisional Secretariat 
remaining outside the control of the Pradeshiya Sabha. The Divisional 
Secretariat was the only institution capable of responding to HIRDEP’s 
ambitious local development strategy, and this explains why HIRDEP by and 
large had to bypass the PS in the planning and implementation of local-level 
development activities. 
 
Other drawbacks are also testimony to the lack of a unified local government 
structure. There is little capacity for internal mobilisation of funds by the PS. 
It is dependent on a small block allocation from the Provincial Council, but 
there is no proper mechanism to coordinate the activities of the Provincial 
Council and the Pradeshiya Sabha at the local level. Some activities may be 
funded through the Decentralised Capital Budget but is at the discretion of 
individual Members of Parliament representing the District. Members of 
Parliament therefore exert much influence over the decisions of PS, thus 
undermining their autonomy. Finally, development administration at the 
divisional level is made no easier by the fact that the Divisional Secretariat as 
well is pulled between different masters, reporting both to central government, 
represented by the Government Agent, and the provincial administration.4 
 
At the same time, despite devolution, the District has continued to retain some 
identity, given the fact the operational base of many of the line agencies 
dealing with non-devolved subjects has been retained within it (Amarasinghe 
et al. nd). All this in effect meant that HIRDEP had to operate within an 
extremely nebulous institutional environment spread across several levels – 
national, provincial, district and divisional. 
 
The process of political devolution, combined with the concerns raised by the 
JVP uprising, has led to a highly visible political presence in the development 
                                                 
4 The Transfer of Powers (Divisional Secretaries) Act, No. 58 of 1992. 
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scene in the Hambantota district. A host of people’s representatives started to 
make their presence felt in the district, comprising Members of Parliament 
representing the district, Provincial Ministers and Councillors, and Pradeshiya 
Sabha members. Hambantota remains a stronghold for leftist politics. In the 
1999 presidential elections 13 percent voted in favour of the JVP candidate, 
which was almost double the national result. 
 
In this political environment HIRDEP, representing the bulk of financial 
resources available to the divisions, was under pressure from local political 
actors. However, the evidence is that more often that not it was able to ‘play 
by the rules’ because of the professional touch with which HIRDEP staff 
handled its responsibilities. The fact that HIRDEP was not a conventional 
government agency gave it added leverage to withstand undue political 
pressures. HIRDEP’s involvement with participatory planning also acted as a 
means to limit the influence of partisan politics on its priorities. However, it 
must also be pointed out that there are also very many instances of close and 
constructive collaboration between HIRDEP and the political establishment.  
Economic liberalisation: HIRDEP’s creativity put to the test  
HIRDEP was committed to a policy of rural-cum-regional development and 
poverty alleviation, and there is no doubt that HIRDEP made a significant 
contribution to improving living conditions in Hambantota District. This has 
been an outcome of its commitment to both improve and install physical and 
social infrastructure in the rural and especially the less accessible parts of the 
district. What has been achieved in alleviating income poverty has been much 
less impressive. It is important to note that at the time of the inception of 
HIRDEP a new government (the United National Party) had been voted into 
power and a policy of economic liberalisation and private sector-led growth 
was declared government policy. The structural reforms that this change 
entailed contributed to deepening poverty and marginalising the poor. These 
changes in macro-economic development and policy have had a deep impact 
on HIRDEP activities. 
 
Both the United National Party (UNP) and later People’s Alliance (PA) 
governments have attempted to resolve this macro-micro policy divergence by 
targeting the poor through poverty alleviation programmes that have income 
transfer and micro-enterprise development components. However, these 
programmes suffer from structural deficiencies. In regard to HIRDEP, the 
activation of first the Janasaviya and later the Samurdhi programme also 
meant that a part of its rural development agenda was pre-empted by the 
above programmes. As such a degree of inter-agency coordination was 
necessary to avoid competition and duplication in regard to the micro-
enterprise sector.  
 
In retrospect, we see that HIRDEP during the first fifteen years was rather 
inward looking, and lacked the capacity to relate to the wider national or the 
regional context. The relative neglect of economic mobilisation reflects 
HIRDEP’s initial concentration on public service provision and social 
mobilisation. However, the phasing-out strategy proposed in the Perspective 
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Plan 1994-1999 (HIRDEP 1994a) did attempt to come to terms with the 
problem of employment and income generation by promoting a set of strategic 
activities that include entrepreneurship development. However, it was not 
until the quest for higher economic growth was put at the top of the political 
agenda of NORAD that a major shift in HIRDEP’s approach was enforced. 
Ironically, this came as late as in 1997 when the days of the programme were 
numbered, causing things to be done rather hurriedly.  
 
About the same time, in 1996, MPPI issued new directives for all IRDPs that 
clearly marked a fundamental turn-around in development focus from poverty 
alleviation to economic growth, and from public goods to the private sector. 
The IRDPs were to: 
 
? reduce their portfolios to concentrate on fewer components and 
activities; 
? have a sharp focus on employment creation, especially for educated 
youth, and on income growth; 
? secure the active and positive participation of the private sector in 
development planning; 
? facilitate and service investment promotion and enterprise development; 
? encourage market-driven economic activity; and  
? design and develop institutional systems and procedures to achieve these 
ends. (HIRDEP 1998) 
 
Soon thereafter the demise of the IRDP concept became evident when GOSL 
announced a new national strategy for regional development based on ‘rural 
economic advancement’ proposed by the RDD in 1997. The Rural Economic 
Advancement Programme (REAP) is “basically concerned with a shift away 
from the welfare and infrastructure based development programmes of the 
IRDPs to programmes supportive of economic growth and employment 
generation. This is to be achieved by mobilizing local potentials through 
enhanced private sector participation” (Karunanayake and Abhayaratna 
2002). 
 
REAP has now supplanted HIRDEP as the strategy to promote regional 
development in Hambantota District.5 The fact that HIRDEP was able to 
support the setting-up of several institutions that will help REAP embark on 
its programme of activities – i.e. Social Mobilisation Foundation (SMF), 
Enterprise Service Centre (ESC), Vocational Training Institute (VTI), and the 
Women’s Development Foundation (WDF) – is not only a testimony to 
HIRDEP’s capacity for institution building. It begs the question of how REAP 
will be able to fill the vacuum after HIRDEP’s catalytic force.  
 
But what has REAP meant in practical terms to the HIRDEP legacy of 
integrated rural development? What is immediately evident is that the ideology 
which guided the formulation of REAP has been considerably modified in its 
                                                 
5 The head office of the Southern Province Regional Economic Advancement Programme is 
located in Galle with a branch project office in Hambantota. Preparatory activities are 
underway pending the finalisation of a loan agreement with the Asian Development Bank. 
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application. In the original policy document outlining the concept of rural 
economic advancement, integrated village development and formulation of 
regional development plans (setting area-based development priorities) had a 
place (RDD 1997). But the concept as enunciated today is firmly guided by a 
concern to promote enterprise development. It is not moulded in the form of a 
conventional regional development programme. Furthermore, REAP is to 
target small and medium investors and not micro-entrepreneurs, although 
there is a small component to assist enterprise development among women 
and youth. The primary aim will be to promote agriculture and agriculture-
related activities through commercialisation and value addition. Unlike 
HIRDEP, REAP is to involve Pradeshiya Sabhas in enterprise activities and 
rightly so. But what will happen to the micro-entrepreneurs and how will 
organisations like the SMF fit into the picture? 
 
While the attempt to catalyse economic development in rural areas in the 
above manner is laudable there is a need to support micro-enterprises based 
on the household to supplement the above strategy so as to help reduce the 
vulnerability of the poor (Gunatilaka and Williams 1998). At the same time 
the opportunity has to be provided for the more dynamic entrepreneurs 
among the poor to cross the threshold of stagnation and lift themselves up to 
become small and medium entrepreneurs. 
 
It was noted above that REAP has no role to play in regional development in 
the conventional sense. Hence there is the likelihood that REAP will result in a 
widening of regional disparities given the fact that there is a propensity for the 
private sector to be drawn to areas with growth potential and also to dynamic 
individuals. In commenting on the initial REAP formulations Karunanayake 
and Abhayaratna (2002) observed that: 
 
...while rural economic advancement is pursued with vigour 
through the REAPs, it is important that the RDD keep the 
broader context of regional development in view. Even if the 
task of (providing) social and physical infrastructure is left to 
specialist agencies, it is of crucial importance that the RDD 
provides the overall framework for such development activities 
from a regional development perspective.  
 
But presently RDD is placed within the Ministry of Western Area 
Development and is in no position to become an effective regional 
development agency. This should be the task for the Southern Province 
Planning Council or the Ministry of Southern Area Development. If it is not 
done, it would mean leaving all that HIRDEP had tried to achieve in rural-
regional development by the wayside.    
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2.2 First Challenge: How to build the capacity of the 
divisional level in development planning and 
management 
A legacy of bottom-up planning 
This section is devoted to a discussion of HIRDEP’s approaches and processes 
relating to local-level planning and institutional strengthening as specific 
components of the phasing-out strategy. It is important to note that the 
phasing-out strategy had been developed on the assumption that HIRDEP was 
to continue beyond the phasing-out stage, though in a modified form. The 
intention according to the architects of the new strategy was that: 
 
The IRD principles and practices embodied in, and developed 
by, HIRDEP are integrated into rural development planning, 
implementation and monitoring routines of existing agencies and 
institutions, to the extent that, effectively, HIRDEP continues as 
an integral part of the local and regional development planning 
system under local and other sources of funding.  (Amarasinghe 
et al nd) 
 
HIRDEP’s approach to planning was based on the process approach from the 
very beginning. It had allowed the planning process to be flexible, thus 
enabling it to modify and adapt itself to changing needs and requirements 
(Hewavitharana 2002). It is this flexibility that enabled HIRDEP to evolve the 
Recurrent and Annually Revolving Planning (RARP) System. Moreover, 
RARP was undertaken as a two-stage process, with Stage 1 involving the 
preparation of project sketches for possible approval in principle by the RDD 
and NORAD at the annual meeting, and Stage 2 involving the preparation of 
detailed proposals that were reviewed and approved by the two agencies 
directly.  
 
By 1982 HIRDEP had developed a planning system for Integrated Community 
Development. This was based on household surveys for the identification of 
the poor followed by multi-disciplinary planning teams preparing proposals 
for implementation by line departments. The preparation of plans involved a 
consultative process with the beneficiaries to (a) identify the problems 
involved and (b) finalise proposals. From 1984 social mobilisers were used for 
the identification of the poor. The implementation of projects was undertaken 
through the Gramodaya Mandalayas, but did not meet with much success for 
reasons noted in chapter 2.1. 
 
The main architects behind HIRDEP constantly sought development 
approaches that effectively addressed rural poverty. In a span of about ten 
years they travelled all the way from a technocratic top-down blueprint 
approach, characterising the first sector projects, to social mobilisation in poor 
communities using so-called village ‘change agents’, focusing on income 
generation at the household level. It is between these two extremes that 
HIRDEP developed what initially was labelled ‘settlement and community 
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development’ and later given the term ‘local level planning’. This segment of 
HIRDEP has since 1982 consistently been the largest. In the period from 1979 
to 1990 it constituted almost 20 percent (Jerve et al 1992:63), and rose to as 
much as 65 percent in the latter phase (1994-99). This approach represented a 
mix of technocratic planning, popular participation and social mobilisation, 
implemented within sub-district geographical areas.  
 
It was first of all in local-level planning that HIRDEP attempted to put into 
practice the concept of ‘integration’. It started with the rehabilitation of 
abandoned irrigation tanks (e.g. in Mattala and Weligama and later Maha 
Alutgamara) and the addition of a package of mutually supportive and multi-
sectoral investments, such as in primary education and health, drinking water 
supply, housing and roads to the communities involved.6 Initially, this type of 
area development project was managed directly by the Planning Unit, but this 
turned out to be a model that could not be replicated on a wider scale. It led 
to the search for an approach that more directly made use of and mobilised 
the existing government structure at local level. 
 
This paved the way, for the first time in 1984 in Katuwana Division, for a 
more systematic approach to local-level planning with people’s participation, 
by bringing in the local-level administration. After Katuwana, similar projects 
were initiated in Hambantota Division in 1985 and Weeraketyia Division in 
1987. In these projects HIRDEP focused on the lowest level of public 
administration, namely the Grama Sevaka Division, which is made up of a 
cluster of villages (now called Grama Niladhari Division), as the area of 
planning and implementation. At this level the Gramodaya Mandalaya (GM) 
institution became the main development partner. Besides the fact that GMs 
only functioned a few years, HIRDEP’s experience was that the GMs mainly 
served the interests of the village elite, and it soon started to look for an 
alternative model of area development. 
Prolonging the legacy 
New opportunities were created with the local government reform of 1987. 
HIRDEP had already for some time been involving the Assistant Government 
Agents (AGA) at the Divisional level, through the authority of the District 
Government Agent and the Deputy Director Planning at the District. It was 
only after the 1987 reform, however, and the return to normalcy after the 
insurgency period, that the concept of divisional level planning emerged. In 
1991 HIRDEP floated a new project proposal for divisional level planning and 
development (project no. 386: Local Level Planning), anchored in the former 
AGA’s office, now labelled a Divisional Secretariat. The intention was to have 
a development plan for each Division prepared by a planning unit of its own, 
and to implement the activities with funds from different sources. HIRDEP, in 
this way, wanted to support the nascent local government structure.  
 
                                                 
6 The term ‘tanks’ refers to reservoirs excavated to retain rainwater for irrigation, watering of 
livestock and bathing. They also contribute to raising the groundwater table, facilitating the 
digging of drinking water wells at the circumference of the water body. This is an ancient 
practice and there are many traces of tanks being built before the advent of modern irrigation. 
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The objectives of the local-level planning project, however, were articulated in 
planning terms rather than governance terms. There was little in the way of 
support for the new governance structure. The role of the new councils of 
elected representatives – Pradeshiya Sabhas – was not properly articulated in 
the project document. HIRDEP’s revised mission was basically to transfer the 
IRD experience, first and foremost its planning approach, to the new 
divisions. The idea was that HIRDEP should become a catalyst for “mini-
IRDPs” at the divisional level under the leadership of Divisional Secretaries.  
 
When NORAD announced at the annual meeting in 1992 its decision to phase 
out its support, HIRDEP was called upon to set its priorities for a phasing-out 
period of about five years. The message from the team formulating the 
phasing-out strategy was crystal clear. In the report “From Project to Process” 
(Amarasinghe et al nd) the team concluded: “(I)t’s present approach in local-
level planning we recommend to be the main focus of investment in the 
future” (p.1), and furthermore that “(T)he implementation responsibilities 
with which HIRDEP is presently burdened would have to be urgently 
transferred to the relevant bodies and to the Divisional Secretariats” (p.2). The 
vision was that the approaches developed by HIRDEP would be transferred 
“to the extent that, effectively, HIRDEP continues as an integral part of the 
local and regional rural development planning system under local and other 
sources of funding” (p.2).  
 
Hence, when HIRDEP subsequently reformulated its overall objectives the 
most explicit of them all related to divisional level planning, namely (a) to 
“improve the capabilities of Divisional Secretary’s Offices to undertake new 
planning and implementation responsibilities”, and (b) to “integrate IRDP 
planning methods and procedures into the system” (Amarasinghe et al nd:54).  
The strategy of integration 
The strategy for how to “integrate IRDP planning methods and procedures 
into the system” was based on three concepts: funding integration, planning 
integration and institutional integration. 
 
Funding integration is another term for co-financing, or more generally a 
process where the IRD concept is applied to all public financial resources 
managed at the divisional level, and no longer exclusively associated with 
NORAD.  Ideally, all sources of funds – i.e. HIRDEP funds, DCB funds, 
Pradeshiya Sabha funds, line agency funds etc. – should contribute to realising 
activities guided by a Divisional Development Plan. In addition, co-funding of 
individual activities should be encouraged. In other words, IRDP should 
transform itself from a NORAD-programme to an overarching development 
planning and management approach of the new local government. 
 
Planning integration is one element of this, and involved measures to 
counteract the mono-sectoral perspectives of line agencies. The only realistic 
approach was to develop a strong planning unit within the Divisional 
Secretariat trained in spatial and multi-sectoral planning. HIRDEP would have 
a special role in promoting this capacity building. 
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The concept of institutional integration relates to the need for bringing non-
state and non-formal institutions into the development process. It is another 
term for participation and the need to promote a sense of ownership among 
community-based organisations and encourage greater responsibility for 
operation and maintenance.  
 
These were the stated visions, but when the HIRDEP Project Director in 1999 
reflected on the experiences of divisional level planning he concluded: “The 
intention was to have a development plan for each Division prepared by a 
planning unit of its own, and to implement the activities with funds from 
different sources. This proved a long shot in the prevailing institutional set 
up” (HIRDEP 1998:5). What happened? Why was the initial vision 
untenable?  
What happened to financial integration?  
We can distinguish between two indicators of successful financial integration. 
The first concerns the extent to which it has been possible to substitute 
funding from NORAD with other sources of development funds within the 
aggregate divisional level budget. A second indicator is the ability of the 
divisional authorities to pool financial resources from different sources for a 
specific project – so-called co-funding.  
 
It was not possible in this study to collect statistical information based on a 
representative sample of divisions and projects, but through interviews and 
project visits in three divisions (Angunakolapelassa, Katuwana and Tangalle) 
we were able to make observations that may have general validity. 
It has not been possible to substitute for the loss of HIRDEP funding 
In Figure 1 and 2 below we present budgets for two divisions – 
Angunakolapelassa (1997-2002) and Katuwana (1994 to 1998). In Katuwana 
we see that at its peak in 1995/96 HIRDEP provided 74 percent of the budget. 
When HIRDEP’s funding tapered off in 1997 and 1998 the shortfall was 
initially partly compensated by the Samurdhi programme, but in 1998 
Katuwana’s total development budget was only half of what it was two years 
earlier. In Angunakolapellassa the trend is similar but not as dramatic. In 
2002 the Samurdhi funds have virtually dried up for all divisions, and their 
financial position is more precarious than for many years. The financial 
situation has worsened, due mainly to the general economic crisis of the 
government, but there is also a lack of political will to give priority to local 
governments. Even the Samurdhi programme has suffered from a considerable 
cutback in funds, despite the high-level political support behind this initiative.  
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Figure 1: Katuwana budget
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We note that in HIRDEP’s Perspective Plan for 1994-99 an assessment was 
made of the availability of other public resources for development in the 
district, probably prompted by the concerns of the donor. Evidently, it was 
impossible for the Planning Unit to get reliable estimates from any sources – 
MPPI, line agencies or Provincial Council. The 1994-99 Plan distinguished 
between NORAD and GOSL contributions, and it is worth noting that no 
government contribution at all was anticipated for the Local Level Planning 
project. In several of the sector projects only minor GOSL contributions are 
indicated, and, with few exceptions, these refer to the financing of operation, 
maintenance and personnel costs (HIRDEP 1994b). 
Fragmentation of financial resources place increasing constraints on 
development 
When HIRDEP was functioning with full vigour it provided the bulk of the 
divisions’ budgetary resources, and moreover, in a transparent and predictable 
manner. However, the situation has drastically changed with the phasing out. 
Not only has the flow of funds been reduced, but the divisional secretariats 
now depend on a number of sources of funding, all being highly unpredictable 
and not synchronised. Delayed receipt of funds by the line departments is a big 
constraint. DCB is often subject to narrow political considerations, and the 
Provincial Council has hardly anything to offer. The Southern Provincial 
Council generates as little as 10-15 percent of its budget from its own 
Figure 2: Angunakolapelassa budget
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resources and has to depend on the centre. This is a situation that is conducive 
to delays and development lapses.  
 
There is little evidence that local authorities have improved their abilities to 
pool financial resources from different sources. There appears to be virtually 
no co-funding of investment costs. Even when HIRDEP funding acted as the 
locomotive, it turned out to be difficult to arrange co-funding, although there 
have been some exceptional cases. These problems were clearly envisaged by 
HIRDEP, and it considered making willingness for and evidence of co-funding 
arrangements a condition for supporting a division: 
 
Given the significant role which co-financing is expected to play 
in Local Level Planning and the need for its political 
acceptability, one of the criteria for the selection of DS Divisions 
for incorporation into the programme is the level of 
collaboration and cooperation which may be expected from 
political representatives from those divisions. This will require 
initial dialogue to inform representatives of the aims and 
purpose of Local Level Planning and to assess their willingness 
to accept the principle involved. (HIRDEP 1994a:36)     
 
However, with few exceptions, 
Local Level Planning projects 
ended up being financed by 
HIRDEP only. 
What happened to planning 
integration? 
HIRDEP’s strategy for local-level 
planning had three main 
components: priority village 
development, spot improvements 
and capacity building for 
divisional planning (HIRDEP 
1993).  
Difficulties in implementing 
priority village development 
The idea was to identify the 
Grama Niladhari divisions most in 
need, the poorest villages, and 
within them the poorest house-
holds. The initial identification of 
villages was a bureaucratic (top-
down) process. However, the 
identification of the most deserv-
ing beneficiaries was carried out 
using the social mobilisers for the 
purpose. Project identification was 
Box 1: The 14 steps for priority area 
development: a case of over-ambitious planning 
Step 1: Workshops in each AGA division to identify (top-
down) the needy GN divisions. Output: Updating AGA 
division profiles. 
Step 2: Selection of priority villages. Output: Report on 
village selection. 
Step 3: Initial consultation at village level with broad 
representation. At least three days per village is needed. 
Output: Records of discussions. 
Step 4: Selection of village volunteers. Output: Report on 
selection. 
Step 5: Training of volunteers and village leaders in rural 
planning. To take place locally. 
Step 6: Survey among village households. To be carried out 
by volunteers. Output: Survey reports. 
Step 7: Selection of needy households on the basis of poverty 
indices. 
Step 8: Identifying needs in meetings with beneficiaries. 
Step 9: Project formulation and revision. Project sketches to 
be drafted by volunteers and completed by divisional 
planning cell. Output: List of projects submitted to HIRDEP 
for funding. 
Step 10: Project appraisal and approval by HIRDEP.   
Step 11: Group meetings to organise people for 
implementation. To be done by volunteers backed by 
division-level government staff. 
Step 12: Implementation by the selected 
community/voluntary organisations. To be organised by 
volunteers, and to be monitored by divisional staff. 
Step 13: Implementation by the selected line agencies. Joint 
monitoring by volunteers, divisional staff and HIRDEP. 
Step 14: Regular progress reporting. Frequent community 
level meetings. Division-level meetings every three months 
with all key stakeholders. Output: Summary reports to 
Colombo every six months. 
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done with the help of various participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques. 
This was followed by the preparation of a Village Development Plan that 
included prioritised proposals to be implemented by the relevant agencies. 
Hence, this was an extension of the procedures tried out in the Integrated 
Community Development (ICD) approach (Hewavitharana 2002).  
 
An elaborate 14-step planning cycle was developed (see Box 1) that was 
indeed very demanding of manpower both for the Planning Unit (PU) and the 
divisional secretariats. In fact, it turned out to be unrealistic. This does not 
mean that bottom-up planning was not attempted, but it took place on a 
limited scale through village meetings, focus group discussions and limited 
surveys. The use of these methods continued up to 1999 on an ad hoc basis.  
 
It is evident that participatory planning never pervaded the planning scene in 
the division. Project activities under the Decentralized Budget (DCB) 
continued to be impositions from the top with planning decisions being 
subsumed by political dictates. Similarly, projects initiated by line departments 
too were carried out without recourse to participatory planning except where 
projects were funded through HIRDEP. The HIRDEP-type local-level planning 
process, financial resources permitting, is today only applied to Divisional 
Secretariat or Samurdhi initiated projects. For other projects, initiated by the 
DCB or the line departments, top-down planning is the normal practice.   
Spot improvements took the bulk of investments 
The idea of “spot improvement” was to fill in the gaps in investment in areas 
that did not qualify as priority areas. In spot improvement projects there was 
little bottom-up or participatory planning. Development proposals emanated 
primarily from line agencies, the Provincial Council, local politicians and 
NGOs. Hewavitharana (2002) observes: 
 
… the filling of gaps will eliminate development vacuum 
remaining from micro-level planning efforts; it will provide 
opportunity for the relevant agencies to prepare their 
development plans with a focus on a particular division and not 
the district; divisional officers will get involved in the entire 
project cycle, identification, implementation and monitoring and 
evaluation. 
 
This turned out to be the main approach to local-level planning, for the 
obvious reason that the planning requirements were fewer and allowed for 
more flexible project identification. Divisional Secretariats were very active in 
forwarding spot improvement proposals. HIRDEP had announced in 1995 
that the most effective Divisions in terms of following the Local Level 
Planning approach would receive most funding, which installed a spirit of 
competition. 
 
The spot improvement concept mirrored in many ways how HIRDEP had 
been used to operate at the district level: open to responding to initiatives from 
various proponents combined with leverage to pursue its own initiatives. The 
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point is that this is a rather different way of working compared to ICD above. 
There is no explicit requirement for backing decisions by reference to an 
overall plan or a comprehensive social analysis of where the strongest needs 
and greatest deficiencies are. Whilst this will raise eyebrows amongst most 
professional planners, it is probably the most effective way of using funds 
given the weak institutional capacity at the local level. The primary concern is 
not whether you do the right thing according to some abstract planning 
criteria, but whether you do the thing you do right.  
 
In other words, when you realistically cannot have both, we would argue that 
the quality of project implementation matters more than the quality of project 
selection, noting that quality of implementation has many facets: technical 
quality, cost-efficiency, institutional capacity building and sustainability. 
HIRDEP did not make much headway in its ambitions to establish mini-
IRDPs, but definitely set new standards for quality of implementation in local-
level projects.  
Capacity in divisional planning was built, but not sustained  
HIRDEP invested heavily in the divisional secretariats. This included the 
financing of training, vehicles, office buildings, staff quarters, office equipment 
etc. A main output was intended to be the formulation of comprehensive plans 
for the divisions. Planning guidelines were prepared and the Assistant 
Directors of Planning attached to the Divisional Secretariats received advanced 
training both locally and abroad.  
 
Today, all Divisional Secretariats have planning units with ‘operations cells’. 
In each Planning Unit the operations cell act as a repository of data and 
display information bearing on the socio-economic situation of the division. 
HIRDEP has supplied each Planning Unit with a computer to facilitate data 
storage and planning activities. However, the computers are now old, the 
facilities are rather rudimentary and many of the trained planning staff have 
moved to other jobs. Although the capacity of the Planning Units and the 
quality of the operations cells vary, there is still evidence of sustained 
improvements. For instance, the planning capability created at the local level 
has enabled the compilation of Resource Profiles for the various divisions of 
the Hambantota District. The Resource Profiles provide useful inputs to the 
planning process. For example the relevance and feasibility of a project may be 
evaluated in the light of information provided in the Resource Profile. In fact 
the Resource Profiles have been useful in identifying development projects 
under the newly established ‘577 Programme’.7 
 
When HIRDEP’s local-level planning started, divisional plans were only based 
on making summaries of annual allocations from various public sources. 
Although databases have improved there it little evidence that the situation 
                                                 
7 This is a programme established by the Ministry of Southern Development to promote 
private sector involvement in rural development. The idea is to link private sponsors to 
specific villages. The sponsor selects from a list of priority projects and provides funding 
directly through a village committee. 
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today is much improved, the main reason, of course, being the unpredictable 
financial situation.   
 
The position today is that the divisions have no authoritative overall 
development strategy, and that the planning process is sharply divided 
between two processes, the one participatory (applicable to Divisional 
Secretariat or Samurdhi initiated projects) and the other top-down (applicable 
to DCB or line department initiated projects). 
What happened to institutional integration? 
The main strategy adopted by HIRDEP had been to contribute to local-level 
planning by integrating with the Divisional Secretariat. Toward this end 
HIRDEP carried out a systematic and effective policy of strengthening the 
planning capacity in each of the 11 Divisional Secretariats. Through this 
process HIRDEP had been in a position to transform itself quite successfully in 
the 1990s from a district to a division-based regional rural development 
agency. However, there was a mismatch between the two processes of 
administrative and political devolution.  
 
The district-based electoral system of proportional representation, which 
abolished one-person constituencies and resulted in the invisibility of the 
electoral division, has constrained integrated area-based development. The 
same invisibility of electoral divisions is characterised at the PC and PS levels 
as well. The situation is further complicated by differences of opinion between 
national and provincial level representatives. The reluctance of different 
agencies operating at the divisional level to pool funds has also been a 
constraint. The line departments are not geared to supporting programmes to 
improve target groups or promote people’s participation. Their primary 
concern is to execute programmes that have been decided centrally (Gamage 
1987). 
 
Local-level planning has been constrained by two system faults. The first is the 
marginalisation of the PS. The Perspective Plan 1994-1999 anticipated this 
problem: 
 
A further aspect of integration, yet to be explored, is integration 
of the planning process with the political decision making 
processes. Without such integration the Integrated Rural 
Development process practiced by HIRDEP over the past 
fourteen years will not be sustained in the future. (HIRDEP 
1994a:6)       
 
As we have argued, such political integration was impossible to achieve in 
practice. There was no attempt on the part of HIRDEP to integrate with the 
Pradeshiya Sabha in project planning and implementation. The PS came into 
the picture only in so far as it took over the maintenance of community and 
infrastructure projects built by HIRDEP. Understandably this is a 
responsibility that the PS undertook without much enthusiasm, as it had been 
bypassed at the implementation stage.  
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Secondly, the District and Divisional Coordinating Committees have failed to 
become development oriented. There is no doubt that these two institutions 
enabled HIRDEP to achieve a degree of inter-agency coordination of its 
activities, but they have failed to recognize their broader developmental goals. 
Hence they have functioned, and continue to function, as problem-solving 
institutions that aim primarily at short-term political ends rather than long-
term developmental goals. As a result there is at times a clear divergence 
between the developmental and the political agenda. The divisional 
committees have failed to meet on a regular basis. A hidden reason is the 
reluctance on the part of some politicians and also the Divisional Secretaries, 
now with the rank of grade 1 officer of the Sri Lanka Administrative Service, 
to attend these meetings. 
 
HIRDEP made a conscious effort to bring civil society organisations into 
development planning at local level. It took the initiative to establish NGO 
forums within several divisions and opened the way for NGO participation in 
Divisional Coordination Committees. The main concern was to get private 
and NGO investments incorporated into divisional plans. Adding to this, 
HIRDEP also supported the establishment of trade associations in several 
divisions, and assisted with office equipment, printed stationery etc. in the 
initial phase. It was considered important to get business people to work with 
the Pradeshiya Sabha. 
 
In the Perspective Plan 1994-1999 the intention was formulated to initiate a 
dialogue on the principles embodied in HIRDEP’s local-level planning strategy 
with politicians at all levels. It would have been an innovative form of 
institutional strengthening. The idea was to use awareness and briefing 
workshops, seminars and field days for the purpose. However it was not 
possible to achieve this in practice as HIRDEP itself would have been 
overstretching its capacity in the process, and not much interest was shown by 
most politicians in such a learning process.  
 
In concluding this section it would be worthwhile mentioning that with 
devolved governance HIRDEP was placed in the unenviable position of having 
to adjust to a system that was itself in a state of evolution. It speaks much for 
the inbuilt resilience of HIRDEP that it was able to cope with the situation by 
transforming itself from a district to a divisional level development agency. 
2.3 Second Challenge: How to ensure that investments 
in social and economic infrastructure will be 
effectively utilised and maintained 
Background 
Over time, through the Project Office, HIRDEP had become increasingly 
involved in implementation, in part due to its innovations related to area 
development and social mobilisation. Answers to many of the developmental 
challenges of the district had been sought in models that deliberately bypassed 
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regular structures. This is part of what innovation means. When a decision 
was made to phase out NORAD’s support, this legacy prompted two 
fundamental questions: 
 
? Would it be possible, or at all desirable, for GOSL to continue HIRDEP 
after the purse-strings to NORAD were cut? 
? If not, or in any event if HIRDEP was meant to be a temporary 
organisation, how could sustainable use of its investments be ensured? 
 
As late as in the 1998 Annual Meeting GOSL requested NORAD to extend 
the support to HIRDEP beyond 1999, but the Norwegian delegation 
responded that the decision was final.8 Evidently, GOSL had no ambition to 
prolong the IRDP programme at its own expense. The official view was that 
times had changed and new instruments were needed. Apparently, the new 
REAP approach was the answer, which, supposedly, would replace the old 
IRDP approach. While there are obvious differences between the two 
approaches, it is difficult to see why the one makes the other redundant. In 
fact, several observers argue that REAP would have benefited substantially 
from being assisted by a HIRDEP-style Planning Unit. The main reason, 
obviously, for the discontinuation of HIRDEP is that NORAD turned the tap 
off, and other donors were promoting REAP. 
 
To all who had followed the programme closely, the closure HIRDEP involved 
two rather different challenges. There was a need to distinguish between (a) 
investments made in building capacity for innovation, and (b) investments in 
regular social and economic infrastructure. The issue of continuation and 
effective use beyond HIRDEP would be fundamentally different in the two 
cases. 
 
The phasing-out strategy, therefore, rested on two pillars. The first pillar 
addressed the challenge of transferring a catalytic role – the planning approach 
of HIRDEP in particular – to other institutions. The idea was to 
institutionalise this to the extent possible within the Divisional Secretariats, 
and hopefully also partly the Provincial Council. In chapter 2.2 we looked at 
the experiences in this regard. In chapters 3.2 and 3.3 below we shall discuss 
how HIRDEP got engaged in creating new institutions partly also to use them 
as vehicles for transferring some of its catalytic functions. The formation of 
both the Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce and the Social 
Mobiliser Foundation was influenced by this agenda. 
 
The second pillar, which is the focus of this chapter, addresses the issue of 
transfer and sustainable use of assets. The term ‘asset’ is frequently used in 
HIRDEP documents, and often in a general way almost synonymous with 
‘project output’. It includes, for instance, training courses, tree seedlings, 
loans, tools and fuel-efficient stoves, besides the more straightforward 
categories such as irrigation schemes, roads and buildings (HIRDEP 1997). 
There is a need to distinguish between assets in the form of a functioning 
public service, which includes organisational aspects as well as financing of 
                                                 
8 Agreed Minutes of Annual Meeting, Colombo, 16 June 1998. 
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operations and maintenance (O&M) on a regular basis, and assets in the form 
of a physical thing or temporary output. It is not an objective in itself that the 
latter kinds of asset should always be used for their original purposes. Besides, 
physical assets have a limited lifespan. It makes little sense, therefore, to talk 
about sustainability of assets when using such a narrow definition of asset. 
The concern here is with the sustainability of systems for the provision of 
critical public services for HIRDEP’s primary target group – the rural poor. In 
Hambantota District the most important services relate to the supply of water 
for irrigation and domestic use, road transport, education facilities, health 
services and marketing outlets. HIRDEP has invested in all these forms of 
services.  
 
To ensure sustainability of service provision HIRDEP faced the following 
challenges:  
 
? Institutional responsibilities had to be clearly defined. This also included 
the role and responsibilities of users/beneficiaries. 
? If necessary, the responsible institutions had to be trained and equipped. 
? Responsibilities held by HIRDEP needed to be properly transferred, 
including that of bringing the quality of physical assets to an acceptable 
level before handing over - e.g. physical condition of a water supply 
scheme. 
? Better systems for financing of O&M had to be developed.  
 
There is little quantitative information available from where we can measure 
changes in the quality of public service provision, and the sustainability of the 
delivery systems. And we were not able to find readily available data on how 
HIRDEP investments fit into this broader picture. Below we present some 
indicative evidence informing our conclusions.  
Mobilising the users  
HIRDEP has financed the installation of about 750 tube wells for community 
drinking water supply (HIRDEP 1997). Initially these were to be maintained 
by the National Water Supply and Drainage Board in a very centralised way, 
but the organisation lacked both the required manpower capacity and 
financial resources. With the support of HIRDEP a new approach was tried 
out, starting in 1992, with the Pradeshiya Sabha (PS) as the lynchpin of the 
O&M system The PS would be handed the ownership of the water supply and 
would form two contracts, one with a water users’ association, and one with 
the Water Board. The users’ association would perform regular maintenance 
and collect a maintenance fee from the consumers, and the PS in turn would 
be responsible for organising repairs. The Water Board would be responsible 
for spare parts supplies and major repairs upon request from the PS.  
 
This decentralised system has improved the situation, but several problems 
remain. There are often not more than twenty households using a well and 
they tend to collect too little money to offset the cost of major repairs. In 
several sites there have been scarcity of water or problems with water quality 
due mainly to salinity, which make people reluctant to pay fees. In 
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Angunakolapellasa Division they have developed, with HIRDEP support, 
about ten water supply schemes with piped connections to the houses. In 
Debokkawa, 215 houses are connected to a pumping scheme using a dug well 
as the source. It has been functioning for 10 years and the maintenance is 
entirely left to the water users’ association. The technology is fairly simple, 
and with 215 members the association is likely to be able to mobilise funds 
also for major repairs, like replacement of a pump engine. Similarly, in 
Wagegoda, Tangalle Division, they had operated a dug well scheme since 
1986 under the management of a users’ association. There are 55 houses 
connected and all have water meters. This was necessary, according to the 
chairman, to stop misuse of water.  
 
The situation is different when the water supply schemes become more 
complex, like the one for supplying Katuwana town. This borehole scheme 
was opened in 1994 and the PS is the owner and operator. Currently the back-
up pump and the chlorinating machine are out of order and the electric 
switchboard poses problems. The caretaker reported that they had requested 
the Water Board to do the repairs, which in turn complained that the private 
supplier of critical spare parts did not respond. The PS had no authority to 
buy services from a private company directly, but on the other hand, as the 
caretaker commented, such companies are generally found only in the 
metropolitan area and it would be very expensive to get them to Katuwana.   
 
Evidently, HIRDEP contributed in a major way to developing and testing 
models for users’ associations in water management. This is also the case with 
irrigation schemes. The lesson is that these organisations can work quite 
effectively and independently provided the members receive a tangible benefit. 
Where the water supply is marginal, land is highly fragmented and cultivation 
only a seasonal occupation it has been difficult to establish effective farmers’ 
associations.  
 
The Ranna-Wadigala project is an example of a successful irrigation project. It 
has been in operation for about five years. The water for irrigation is pumped 
from the nearby Urubokka River into a central tank and distributed by gravity 
through pipes to individual farmers. It took 15 years to finish the project from 
the first initiative taken by two local farmers. The scheme is entirely managed 
by the farmers’ association (with about 150 members), and although this is a 
fairly complex project, good returns from vegetable production makes it 
economically feasible. 
 
HIRDEP demonstrates the lesson that maintenance by users’ associations is no 
panacea. Factors that matter include level of technology, number of people 
involved, and O&M costs relative to actual or perceived benefits. With the 
present drought, for instance, many irrigation tanks are not being looked 
after. But HIRDEP has helped by demonstrating that user involvement is, 
nevertheless, the way forward. Importantly, the sheer number of the projects 
where HIRDEP promoted users’ involvement has brought these ideas beyond 
the immediate circle of development planners and activists to the population 
more widely. To use a recent concept in vogue, HIRDEP’s investment in 
‘social capital’ in this way is probably the one that will yield the highest 
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returns over time, provided economic and political conditions remain 
favourable. 
Capacity of line agencies withers  
Institutional strengthening of the line and other agencies has been a primary 
phasing-out consideration for HIRDEP. This was attempted in several ways. 
Provision of new buildings and renovation of existing buildings have 
contributed to the stock of physical infrastructure. And agencies were also 
allocated projects with the intention that the project was a means of 
strengthening their institutional capacity.  
 
HIRDEP’s expenditures on social development activities, such as education, 
health and community development services, have been considerable.  In order 
to expand free education facilities for poor people, around 320 buildings were 
constructed and 9 playgrounds developed in various schools. Furthermore 
180,000 new furniture and equipment items were provided for government 
schools. In addition to providing infrastructural facilities, a programme was 
initiated to train schoolteachers for Advanced Level classes. This seems to 
have had a noticeable effect on the educational standard of the District. Prior 
to commencement of these training programmes, Hambantota occupied 22nd 
place among the 25 districts in Sri Lanka in terms of Advanced Level results. 
By the late 1990s the District had jumped to 2nd place. With the termination of 
NORAD funding, the teacher training programme was discontinued, and the 
most recent figures show that Hambantota is now more or less back in its pre-
HIRDEP position. It is part of the picture that many trained teachers have 
requested and obtained transfers to other Districts.  
 
Investment in health accounts for 5 percent (Rs.54 million) of total 
expenditure during the entire period of HIRDEP – mostly in the form of 
buildings and equipment. 98 hospital buildings were constructed, 47 operating 
theatres established or developed and 2 health centres set up. There is evidence 
that health conditions in Hambantota are relatively better than what its 
economic conditions would have indicated. In terms of GDP per capita 
Hambantota District ranks 13th among districts in Sri Lanka while in terms of 
life expectancy at birth it occupies a higher rank. The latest figures on infant 
mortality shows Hambantota far ahead of the more economically developed 
neighbouring districts, Matara and Galle.9 There is no statistical evidence yet 
that health conditions are worsening as a result of reduced health sector 
budgets, but this is to be expected. 
Successful civil society capacity building 
There has been a remarkable proliferation of civil society organisation in the 
district over the last two decades. This, of course, as been a national and even 
global trend, but there is no doubt that HIRDEP has been a major catalytic 
factor. In Table 1 we have listed all organisations that have been formed 
largely as a result of HIRDEP projects and are registered as formal recipients 
                                                 
9 In 1997 the rate for Hambantota was 5.9 per 1000 live births, while for Gall and Matara the 
figures were 16.4 and 17.8 respectively (Southern Provincial Council 2002:36-39). 
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of assets financed by HIRDEP. Many of them are cooperative-type ventures, 
and some are professional associations.  
 
HIRDEP has also promoted the development of NGOs. This goes back to the 
early 1980s, when Mr. Leelasena, the first HIRDEP Project Director, invited 
people from local NGOs to receive training in social mobilisation. In total 16 
NGOs responded – all small and embryonic organisations. From this group 
the first social mobilisers were identified. Today, the Social Mobiliser 
Foundation reports a membership of 17,000 involving almost a quarter of 
families in the district. The Women Development Foundation in the same 
period has grown to a membership of 30,000, all women. Although never a 
direct beneficiary of HIRDEP, it was greatly helped by the activities of 
HIRDEP and later, in 1994, it received support directly from NORAD.  These 
are the two biggest NGOs in the district, but there are numerous smaller ones, 
and HIRDEP took the initiative to create a NGO Forum. Interestingly, and 
rather unconventionally, this is coordinated by the Hambantota Chamber of 
Commerce – another of HIRDEP’s institutional offsprings.   
 
Most observers would agree that HIRDEP’s impact on civil society 
development probably is its most sustainable and greatest contribution to the 
district. This holds not only for the formal organisations, but also, even to a 
greater extent, for the emancipating effect of HIRDEP’s social mobilisation. 
HIRDEP has amply demonstrated the potential for mobilising the poor for 
development purposes. This is evident in the mobilisation of small groups for 
production and savings purposes. The environmental groups, or the 
Thurulatha associations, are another example. Similarly, water users’ 
associations and farmer organisations play important developmental roles 
today.  
 
It is a significant development that female members of these NGOs by far 
outnumber male members. In discussions with women’s groups it was evident 
that group dynamics have contributed to their uplift both socially and 
economically, and the experience of SMF in small group organisation and 
micro-credit has been actively used by other organisations, such as the state-
sponsored Samurdhi movement as well as the many other NGOs that have 
visited SMF and HIRDEP over the years.   
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Table 1: “New” institutions in Hambantota directly supported by HIRDEP 
 
Civil society organisations  
“nurtured” by HIRDEP 
Comments 
Handicraft centre A collective enterprise 
District Fisheries Federation 58 Fisheries Societies are registered of which 
45 are functioning 
Ruhunu Ridiyagama Agriculture Association Membership organisation selling agricultural 
produce and inputs 
Highland farmers’ organisations Formed under the Highland Farming Project - 
about 8 organisations are active 
Tissahamarama Export Village Formed under Readware Project. About 2500 
women are members. 
Ambalantota Trade Association  
Social Mobiliser Foundation  
Milk Cooperative Society  
Sericulture Cooperative Society (Bedigama) Now defunct 
Sanasa Hambantota Thrift and Credit Cooperation 
Society Union Ltd. 
Amarawewa livestock cooperative society Operating in the buffer zone to Yale national 
park 
 
Public agencies  
“brought to” Hambantota by HIRDEP 
Comments 
Vocational Training Authority  
Coconut Development Board  
Post and Telecommunication HIRDEP supported the establishing of a main 
post office  
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3 Creating new economic opportunities for 
the poor 
The relevance of HIRDEP interventions in the wider picture of developmental 
change can be assessed, but measuring the exact impact is not possible. In this 
section we shall identify the main features of the bigger picture, where 
information is available, which will enable us to evaluate how HIRDEP 
responded to emerging needs and trends, how HIRDEP investments may have 
contributed to the trends observed, and where HIRDEP initiatives were not 
successful due to unfavourable circumstances. This perspective of relevance 
will be used when we study main challenges during the phasing-out period, 
namely how to sustain the investments made in building up the Social 
Mobilisation Programme (chapter 3.2), and how to support private sector 
development and employment creation more effectively (chapter 3.3).  
 
3.1 Situating HIRDEP in the big picture: patterns of 
economic, environmental and social change in 
Hambantota District  
 
During the period of over two decades of its operation, HIRDEP 
has made a significant contribution to raise the quality of life of 
the people and to improve the conditions of many remote parts 
of the Hambantota district. Its interventions aimed at increasing 
productivity, income and employment focused on both farm and 
non-farm sectors had a favourable impact on the beneficiaries. 
However, it is difficult to determine to what extent the positive 
results can be attributed to the HIRDEP alone. Other factors, 
notably exogenous factors such as weather conditions are likely 
to have played a significant part in the predominantly 
agriculture-based economy. Moreover, HIRDEP interventions in 
these sectors were undertaken alongside parallel interventions 
carried out by other government and non-government agencies. 
(Atapattu 2002) 
Introduction 
Looking at development trends in the district from about 1980 until today, six 
features stand out: 
? Significant improvements in standards of living, but the poverty level 
remains high; 
? Primary sectors remain the main employer and source of income; 
? Growth in agricultural productivity but stagnation in output; 
? Slow growth in industrial development and formal employment; 
? Substantial improvement in social development indicators; 
? Water scarcity and drought cloud future development prospects. 
C M I  
 33 
Poverty on the decline but the pace is slow 
Living conditions in Hambantota have improved over the last 20 years, and 
people readily give testimony to this. They emphasise that the relative isolation 
of the district has lessened and local markets have expanded, factors which 
have increased economic opportunities. Social service provision has also 
gradually improved. 
 
Studies show, however, that still as much as one-third of the population can 
be classified as poor in terms of income or consumption. Considerable 
progress was made in reducing poverty in the country as a whole between 
1985 and 1990, with poverty levels declining by 18 percent. There are no 
reliable statistics for Hambantota for the same period, but baseline studies 
conducted for HIRDEP in 1980 and 1990 show major improvements in 
housing standards. In Bedigama, a typical farming village, the proportion of 
traditional wattle and daub houses declined from 65 to 47 per cent. In 
Katuwana, similarly, the number of brick-walled houses increased from 23 to 
61 per cent. In Kudawella, an important fishing village, the proportion of 
houses without toilets dropped from 67 to 21 per cent (Jerve et al 1992).  
 
Using data from the Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) of 
1990/91 and 1995/96, the percentage of households in poverty in Hambantota 
was estimated at 37 and 30 respectively. This indicates a positive trend, but at 
a level of poverty higher than the national average, estimated at 30 per cent in 
1990/91 and 27 per cent in 1995/96. It should be noted that the national 
average for rural areas is close to the figures for Hambantota, namely 35 and 
29 per cent respectively. Although the district records average monthly 
household income and expenditure levels below the national average, its 
income level is substantially higher than those of the neighbouring districts 
Moneragala or Badulla. Yet, the percentage of Janasaviya and Samurdhi 
recipients in Hambantota has been substantially higher than the national 
average. For instance, in the early 1980s about 60 per cent of the people were 
receiving food stamps, though this is not a good indicator of poverty as non-
targeted groups also get access to them. In 2000, the percentage of households 
receiving food and economic support was 60 per cent compared to the 
national average of 39 per cent. 
 
If we use a more comprehensive definition of poverty it appears that 
Hambantota has performed relatively better, but remains below the national 
average. Based on the Human Poverty Index developed by UNDP in the 1998 
National Human Development Report, 23 per cent of households were 
classified as poor, compared to the average of 18 per cent for the whole 
country (1994 figures). The regional pattern of development in Sri Lanka 
shows substantial variation in life expectancy, education and GDP. In the 
same report, the Human Development Index (HDI) ranked the Southern 
Province 5th of the 7 provinces for which the index has been calculated. Only 
the Central and Uva Provinces were less developed. Among the 17 districts for 
which data are available, Hambantota ranked 9th while other dry zone districts 
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like Kurunegala, Polonnaruwa and Anuradhapura ranked 2nd, 3rd and 4th 
respectively.10  
 
In terms of human development, Hambantota District scores much better than 
neighbouring Matara, which ranked 15th, and Moneragala, which ranked 16th. 
This good performance is in spite of sluggish economic growth, in particular 
very slow rates of industrial development. It can probably be attributed to 
improvements in social, economic and community infrastructure facilities over 
a long period, starting from the early 1980s, for which HIRDEP was the main 
source of funding.  
 
Expansion in transport services is a precondition of economic growth, and 
although the road network of the district is still poor in comparison to many 
other districts, during the past two decades many isolated settlements like 
Gonagolla and Suriyawewa have been provided with motorable access roads 
and also connected to better A and B grade roads. Before the 1980s, many of 
the village settlements, especially those located in the east and central parts, 
were isolated, mainly due to a lack of motorable roads. In 1980 there were 
3000 registered motor vehicles (including motorbikes) in the district and by 
1998 this number had grown six times. The number of households connected 
to electricity increased about four times in the same period. In 1981 only 
about 6 per cent of the total households in the district had electricity and by 
1996, 23 per cent of the households had been connected.  
Employment is still largely dependent on the primary sector 
Hambantota District depends heavily on rural economic activities. Especially 
in semi-arid areas in the district, the economy is dominated by agricultural and 
fisheries production. In addition, inhabitants in these areas also practise 
highland farming in sedentary forms as well as in traditional shifting forms, 
though the latter types of farming practice are largely declining. Paddy 
farming under irrigated conditions is the mainstay of the economy in most 
rural areas. The most important source of income for the coastal population is 
fishing and related activities. The population distribution reflects the 
importance of primary production, with nearly 96 per cent of the population 
living in rural areas. The corresponding proportions in Galle and Matara 
districts are 87 per cent and 89 per cent respectively. Although employment in 
agriculture and related activities declined in all three districts between 1981 
and 1997 (Table 2), agriculture, fisheries and related activities in Hambantota 
still account for over 57 per cent of the employed population (Atapattu 2002).  
 
The formal wage sector of the district, both in public sector agencies and 
private sector enterprises, is small. Hambantota has not attracted much 
private sector investment in the past, and waged employment in the private 
sector has therefore been limited. The small enterprise sector has been given a 
helping hand by a number of people’s organisations assisted by public sector 
                                                 
10 The indexes have been calculated for 17 out of 25 districts, as data are not available for 
districts in the north and east due to the war. Areas that come under Anuradhapura and 
Polonnaruwa districts have benefited from investments under the country’s largest irrigation 
cum land settlement project, namely the Mahaweli Accelerated Development Program.      
C M I  
 35 
organisations. The employment opportunities created are mostly in the form 
of self-employment. 
 
The growth of employment in manufacturing has been slow, from 5.5 per cent 
in 1981 to 9.2 per cent in 1997. Only a few large enterprises are found in the 
district; small factories and very small cottage industries dominate. There has 
also been a slow growth in services like “trade and hotels”. In 1997, public 
sector employment amounted to 23 000 and about 50 000 were employed in 
the private sector. Of a total labour force estimated at 207 000 this shows a 
low share of salaried employment.   
 
Table 2: Percentage of employed population by major industry group by 
district in the Southern Province, 1981 – 1997 
1981 1997 INDUSTRY 
DIVISION GALLE MATARA HAM’TOTA GALLE MATARA HAM’TOTA 
 
Agriculture, 
Fishing, etc. 
39.2 50.6 60.7 36.1 44.0 57.4 
Mining and 
Quarrying 
0.5 0.2 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.9 
Manufacturing 11.7 7.0 5.5 18.5 10.7 9.2 
Electricity, Gas 
and Water 
0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.3 
Construction 4.1 3.6 4.4 7.8 6.1 4.5 
Trade and Hotel 
etc. 
12.2 9.4 7.2 12.4 10.7 9.3 
Transport, Storage 
and 
Communication 
5.1 4.1 1.8 5.0 5.0 4.1 
Finance, Insurance 
etc. 
0.8 0.9 0.6 0.9 1.5 1.1 
Personal Services 16.5 15.0 11.3 17.5 14.7 13.0 
Other 9.3 8.9 7.2 0.9 6.1 0.2 
Source: Atapattu 2002 
 
Since the early 1980s some structural changes in the labour market have 
become visible, but they signify only a gradual and slow process of economic 
modernisation: 
? The labour force participation rate has increased somewhat – from 42 
per cent in 1981 to 46 per cent in 1997.  
? The labour force participation rate of women is relatively low as 
compared to the other two districts in the province. Female participation 
rate in Hambantota was 27 per cent in 1997 while Galle and Matara 
districts registered 32 and 35 per cent respectively. It is worth noting that 
this is for Hambantota an increase from 17 per cent in 1981.  
? The share of agriculture in employment has declined only marginally 
from 61 to 57 per cent over the period, which means that the number of 
persons engaged in agriculture today is much larger than it was in 1981. 
? The rate of unemployment in the district in 1981 was 20 per cent, and 
had declined to 15 per cent by 1997. 
? The 15 per cent rate of unemployment in 1997 was high compared with 
the national average of 7.6 per cent. A high rate of unemployment 
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among educated youth is considered one of Hambantota’s main 
development, as well as political, challenges.    
Water shortage limits development 
Compared with an average annual rainfall of 1850 mm in the island, annual 
average rainfall in Hambantota is 1016 mm. Rainfall occurs between October 
and January and April to May while February to March and June to 
September are usually dry. As the rainfall is distributed unevenly, semi-arid 
climatic conditions can be observed in the eastern and southernmost parts of 
the district. Prolonged drought was observed during the last four years and the 
situation was most acute in 2001.   
 
Hambantota has 10 rivers or streams; however, except for the four perennial 
rivers, the entire river basin system undergoes periods of water stress almost 
every year. Since the 1970s until about the end of the 1980s there were 
intensified efforts at expanding irrigated paddy cultivation by diverting river 
water from water surplus areas to water deficit areas. Over the last ten years, 
however, the acreage of paddy sown annually has remained more or less 
constant (Atapattu 2002, Table 4). Today, there are 20 major irrigation 
schemes in the district with an irrigable area estimated at 21 207 ha. There are 
also 723 minor tanks with a total irrigable area of 4 066 ha. Kirindi-Oya 
basin is the most water-stressed river basin system of the district, and many 
farmers that depend on it face serious water shortages. 
 
Drinking water has been a high priority area of investment in Hambantota, 
but little over half the population has access to piped water or wells. The 
Demographic Survey of 1994 conducted by the Department of Census and 
Statistics revealed that 28 per cent of the housing units in the district obtained 
drinking water from unprotected wells, river/tank systems or other similar 
sources, exposing them to water-borne diseases. Still, this was better than for 
the Southern Province as a whole (37 per cent), and for Sri Lanka as a whole 
(32 per cent). It is a growing problem in many locations, however, that tube 
wells are not in operation due to lack of maintenance or increased salt or iron 
content in the water. 
Diversification of agriculture but stagnation in paddy  
There have been some significant gains in agricultural development over the 
last two decades that partly explain the continued dominance of agriculture in 
the economy of the district. Between 1979-1999 the irrigated land area was 
extended by an additional 10 000 ha, and major advances have been made in 
crop diversification. For instance, banana (plantain) cultivation has been 
transformed from a rain-fed backyard crop to a lucrative, irrigated cash crop. 
Some irrigated paddy lands have been turned into more profitable banana 
cultivation, contributing to, for instance, the economic growth in areas 
surrounding Suriyawewa town. Not only has there been an increase in the 
area under banana cultivation, but also significant gains in productivity. The 
bunches of plantain per hectare increased from 590 in 1994 to 808 in 2000, 
resulting in a 50 per cent increase in the total banana production in the period. 
Significant increase in production of various vegetables, such as bitter gourd, 
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cucumber, green gram, brinjals and okra, are also recorded. Not only has the 
area under these crops increased but productivity as well. Production of green 
chillies, for instance, increased by 125 per cent from 1980 to 1999. The spread 
of cashew, green gram and cassava production is also noteworthy. 
Furthermore, before 1980 Hambantota was not known for goat farming, 
while at present there are between 400-500 households engaged in goat 
farming with a stock estimated at 25,000 goats.  
 
These advancements can probably be attributed to improvements in 
agricultural extension and infrastructure facilities during the past two decades 
– e.g. extension of the irrigated area under major tanks, rehabilitation or 
construction of minor irrigation schemes, and development of rural roads and 
transport and storage facilities. However, the growth of the sector seems to be 
stagnating. The overall performance of the agricultural sector would have 
been weak but for the introduction of new crops such as cashew, groundnuts 
and banana. Paddy production did not record any improvement during the 
period 1994-2000 (see Figure 4). The average yield of paddy displayed a 
marginal improvement from 4048 kg per hectare in the 1993/94 Maha season 
to 4354 kg per hectare in 1999/00 Maha. 
 
The factors associated with this situation are probably many: water shortages, 
prolonged droughts, population pressure on land and fluctuations of prices of 
agricultural produce. At the outset, as much as 35 per cent of the land is 
classified as unsuited for agriculture. The wet and intermediate areas, which 
are intensively used for settlements, homesteads, irrigated and rainfed paddy 
and upland farming, make up about 22 per cent, and on the rest of the land 
(43 per cent) agriculture is constrained by agro-climatic factors (Dayaratne 
and Kulatunga 1991). For this reason, Hambantota has land available for 
industrial purposes, while the prospects for agricultural growth are at best 
uncertain. 
 
Over 30 per cent of the asweddumized area of paddy11 under both major and 
minor irrigation schemes in Hambantota remains uncultivated, due mainly to 
a shortage of irrigation water made worse by the recent drought. Under minor 
irrigation schemes and rainfed conditions paddy is produced mainly during the 
Maha (rainy) season, as water availability is uncertain in the Yala (dry) 
season. Over two-thirds of the district is affected by the vagaries of weather 
and prolonged droughts. For instance, agricultural production under 
Lunugamwehera and Muruthawela tanks (parts of the Kirindi Oya scheme) 
has virtually ceased.  
 
The district has a large population to support. Hambantota has a large 
proportion of the total population inhabiting the entire dry zone.12 The district 
covers only 6 per cent of the total area of dry zone, but in 1981 it accounted 
for 10 per cent of its total population, 11 per cent of the agricultural land, and 
14 per cent of the smallholdings (Silva 1991). The population pressure on land 
                                                 
11 Land levelled and bunded for regulation of water supply for paddy cultivation. 
12 The districts defined as dry zone include Hambantota, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya, Mannar, 
Jaffna and Puttalam.  
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increases especially as industrial and service sectors have not developed to a 
satisfactory level to absorb surplus population from the agricultural sector. 
Thus the farmers have adopted complex tenure systems and have tended to 
subdivide the existing agricultural holdings. In this manner tenure problems 
have resulted in an impasse affecting not only the adoption of new technology 
but also proper land management to increase land productivity. The majority 
of existing land holdings are under 0.5 ha. In particular, paddy is produced by 
thousands of smallholder land operators, and many of them operate holdings 
that are not economically viable.13 
 
In addition to suffering from the vagaries of weather, crops cultivated under 
rain-fed conditions also are affected by market price fluctuations and other 
macro-economic policy changes. These crops, often referred to as poor man’s 
crops, suffered severally under the policies of trade liberalisation and de-
subsidisation, and also under the impact of the floating Rupee, which 
escalated the cost of inputs (Hewavitharana 2002).   
 
Paddy cultivation has fluctuated significantly over the last two decades. Figure 
4 clearly illustrates this, covering the period 1993 to 1999 with data from 
both seasons. There is even a decline that can be attributed mainly to drought, 
though the continual spread of salinity on irrigated land and filling up paddy 
lands for housing and other construction purposes also play a role in reducing 
the area under paddy cultivation.  
 
There has been a considerable growth in animal husbandry over the last 
twenty years, which is a clear indication of diversification in agriculture 
prompted by the vagaries of paddy cultivation. The stock of buffalo has 
doubled during this period. Buffalo curd has been a traditional cottage 
industry that the district has had a reputation for, and the curd industry has 
thrived over the years by extending curd supplies to major cities like Galle and 
Colombo.  Whereas the number of cattle grew by only 40 per cent, there has 
been a quadrupling of the goat stock and a doubling of poultry. Goat farming 
has captured the attention of the people in the district, due mainly to the 
initiatives of HIRDEP. As goats have a greater tolerance for the arid 
environmental conditions, this is a venture that has much potential for 
expansion, though many Buddhists for religious reasons avoid this production. 
The Hijra Company that supplies a significant proportion of poultry products 
in the country has started its investment in response to a request by 
Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce (HDCC). This benefits the small 
farmers as the company has introduced outgrower schemes.  
 
                                                 
13 Paddy farming on about two acres under assured irrigation (under perennial tanks or 
reservoirs) can result in a small surplus over subsistence needs. However, a great majority of 
farmers in the district operate less than 0.5 ha, and acute land scarcity prevalent in many parts 
of the country has manifested itself in a rapidly expanding rural proletariat, the widespread 
occurrence of share tenancy, fragmentation of farm units and general poverty in the 
countryside.  
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Figure 4: Paddy cultivation Hambantota District 1993/94 - 1999/2000
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Land scarcity and threatening environmental degradation  
Of the 260,930 ha of land in Hambantota District, half consists of national 
parks, forests and forest reserves, and only a quarter of the land is under 
paddy, coconuts, export crops, other perennial crops and homesteads. The 
district population grew by 54 per cent from 340 300 persons in 1971 to 525 
370 persons in 2001, which represents an average annual growth rate of only 
about 1 per cent.14  
 
The population density today is 204 persons per square km and the 
population density is much higher in the wetter western part of the district. As 
a consequence, even the modest population growth has resulted in a dwindling 
land-person ratio, and people from the western parts of the district have 
continued to migrate to eastern parts in search of cultivable land, and to 
encroach on land to build homes. Thus the eastern part is shifting rapidly 
from being a frontier area to a more densely populated area with increasing 
pressure on cultivable land. The eastern part of the district has also been 
attracting landless people from nearby wet zone districts like Galle, Matara 
and Rathnapura. 
 
                                                 
14 A population census in 1991 was not carried out due to unsettled conditions in the East. 
Even the population census in 2001 was completed only in a few districts.  
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The total land area under forests in Hambantota is about 51 per cent, if forest 
reserves and national parks are included. The forested area in the country as a 
whole had dwindled to 22 per cent by mid 1980s. Hambantota is thus in a 
relatively favourable position, but the pressure to clear forests for agriculture 
and human settlement, for timber extraction and for cutting fuel-wood has 
been increasing over the years. As a result, the area under dense forest has 
decreased while the area under scrubland has increased.15 However, it is a 
positive sign that the area under forest plantations has increased, showing the 
effects of various reforestation programmes, many supported by HIRDEP.  
Substantial growth in fisheries 
Though estimates of fishing population, fishing crafts and fish catch vary 
between different sources, these clearly indicate a growth in the fishing 
industry in terms of fishing craft used, size of the annual fish catch and 
population engaged in fishing. In 1981, there were 1466 vessels, of which 73 
per cent were of the traditional oru type. Four years later statistics (if reliable) 
show that the number of vessels had increased by about 300 but now oru 
boats made up only 38 per cent of the fleet (this is a reduction of 400 boats in 
four years from about 1000). In 1999 the fishing fleet had been further 
modernised and included 239 multi-day vessels and 707 outboard vessels used 
for deep sea fishing. It is worth noting that 420 orus were registered. Hence, 
the rate of decline in the number of traditional vessels had fallen, indicating a 
possible process of economic differentiation among fishermen.  
 
Conditions in the coastal zone, the 2 km wide area along the coastal belt from 
Kudawella to Kirinde, have improved significantly during the last two 
decades. The improvements include provisioning of community infrastructure 
facilities like rural roads, water supply, housing schemes and electricity supply. 
In addition, production facilities like fish landing centres, marketing facilities 
and cold storage have been introduced during the past two decades. There are 
30 fish landing centres in the district now. Similarly, the strengthening of 
fisheries cooperatives under the HIRDEP assistance has benefited over 5000 
fisher families, according to HIRDEP documents.  
 
The total fish catch increased from 8117 Mt in 1981 to 23 260 Mt in 1995 
and then to 32 990 Mt in 1999, indicating productivity growth. It also 
appears that the number of families that depend on fishing for a livelihood 
increased in the same period. It can be expected that a similar growth in 
related sectors, such as boat building, engine repairs, and services in the 
transport and sale of fish, has taken place, increasing the number employed in 
the fisheries sector. Still, it appears that the fisheries sector has not yet realized 
its full potential. For instance, lagoon fishing remains undeveloped and though 
the number of prawn farms along the coastal line is increasing, the potential 
for prawn farming goes untapped. 
                                                 
15 Information compiled by Land Use Policy Planning Division (LUPPD) in 2001 and statistics 
issued by the Department of Census and Statistics in 1988. 
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Manufacturing grows slowly 
In all three districts of the Southern Province, manufacturing is in its 
embryonic stage of development. Growth of manufacturing in Hambantota is 
slow for a number of reasons. In general, the district is relatively poor in terms 
of buying power, and it is far from the centres of economic activity, and from 
seaport and airport. Hambantota may also have been affected by a poor 
natural resource base to support a major industrial drive, and it has had a 
reputation for radical politics by educated unemployed youth since the early 
1970s. Possibly, the latter may have scared away investors. The experience of 
the garment industry provides an illustrative example. In spite of the fact that 
the garment industry has locational flexibility, and the Government has 
provided incentives to locate them in “difficult areas”, Hambantota attracted 
only a few factories.16 
 
Salt production using seawater and solar energy is, besides agriculture 
processing, the only major manufacturing based on natural resources. It is a 
major source of employment for the poor, especially during the lean 
agricultural seasons and at times of prolonged drought. Rice milling is the 
second most important manufacturing activity. In 1980 there were about 570 
rice mills. This is now reduced to about 200, and only about one third are in 
operation. In the early 1980s, other non-farm activities such as light 
engineering were concentrated mainly in towns (Ambalantota, Beliatta, 
Katuwana and Tissamaharama), but rice mills as well as light industries are 
more widely spread now.   
 
There are no industrial statistics for the district providing reliable time series, 
partly because differing classifications are used. A Census of Industries taken 
in 1977 listed 225 ‘main enterprises’ and 1443 ‘small industries’, which 
included processing of rice, salt, ice and manufacturing of clothes. There were 
5662 ‘small business or industrial establishments’ in 1995, while a survey 
from 1998 recorded only 10 industries employing more than 100 people.  
Stagnation in tourism 
Hambantota is endowed with a range of natural resources pointing to a 
significant potential for tourism. These include aquatic resources, sunny 
beaches, forests and wildlife sanctuaries. Sri Lanka’s biggest National Park, 
Yala (YNP), is situated in the district and there are two bird sanctuaries, in 
Bundala and Weerawila, providing opportunities for eco-tourism. In the 
district or in its vicinity are also found a large number of other attractions for 
tourists, including ancient archaeological monuments, caves used by ancient 
people, hot springs at Madunagala, waterfalls in the north, and a blowhole 
(Hummanaya) along the coastal road to Tangalle. 
 
                                                 
16 The Two Hundred-Garment Factory Project was launched in 1992 by the Government to 
encourage private sector involvement in setting up garment factories in the more backward 
rural areas in the country. The Government used its authority to distribute as quotas the total 
annual allocation granted to Sri Lanka by the main importing countries under the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement to locate garment factories in such areas. By 1993, the project had established 
131 garment factories out of which only a few have been located in Hambantota.  
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Still, there are few tourist hotels in the district, and the number of tourists has 
declined in the recent past, according to hotel managers. One major factor 
that they attribute this problem to is the armed conflict in the North and East, 
scaring foreigners away from the country. The Yala National Park has been 
closed for tourists for a long time due to security problems. 
 
But the development of tourism in Hambantota is also affected by a host of 
factors. Some of the beaches are not suitable for swimming due to rapid 
currents, others are polluted, or the beauty of the coastal landscape has been 
affected by various constructions. Beaches in the southwest of the district are 
affected by heavy erosion. Moreover, access to the district from other parts of 
the country is difficult.17 Furthermore, there is a weak organisational set-up for 
tourist promotion and a lack of modern tourist facilities like golf courses, 
organised fishing and boat trips and the like. Finally, unreliable power supply 
has also been a deterrent to major tourism development.   
A leap forward in social development 
Education services improved between 1986 and 1996. In 1994, Hambantota 
scored 0.730 points on an education index, compared to the average of 0.670 
points for the 17 districts in the country. The literacy rate in the district is 
high; the percentage of adult population with literacy skills in 1981 was 82 
per cent (88 for males and 76 for females), increasing to 87 per cent in 1994.  
 
As regards health services there have been similar improvements, but most 
significantly in primary and preventive care. According to district medical 
sources, mortality and morbidity patterns have changed during the last two 
decades. In the early 1970s, malnutrition and communicable diseases such as 
malaria, respiratory tract infections (including tuberculosis), diarrhoeal 
diseases, venereal diseases, and “children’s diseases” (whooping cough, 
measles and diphtheria) were the most prevalent health problems. Similarly, 
specific conditions such as complications during pregnancy and birth delivery 
were not satisfactorily addressed by the existing health services during the 
1980s. In terms of the above conditions much improvement has been made 
during the 1990s.  
 
Improvement in health care facilities, increasing literacy rates and 
improvement in nutrition may have contributed significantly to reducing the 
mortality rates. For instance, mortality measured in terms of crude deaths per 
1000 population fell from 4.6 in 1989 to 3.9 in 1998. The maternal mortality 
rate showed a similar trend, dropping from 0.4 per thousand live births in 
1982 to 0.3 in 1992. Maternal deaths fell from 0.4 per 1000 live births in 
1982 to 0.29 in 1989. The district experienced a remarkable drop in the infant 
mortality rate from 29.5 per 1000 live births 1981 to 6.5 in 1991. The rate 
dropped further to 3.3 in 1996.  
 
                                                 
17 The planned investments in an international airport, a highway from Matara to Colombo, 
together with extension of the railway to Hambantota, will dramatically improve the 
accessibility of the region. 
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Improvements in curative care are less pronounced. In 1983 Hambantota had 
20 hospitals and by 1994 this number has increased to 22. Hospital beds per 
1000 population increased only from 2.06 in 1981 to 2.11 in 1994, and then 
again to 2.3 in 2000. In 1994 the availability of medical officers per 1000 
population was 0.054, and this rate was much lower than the national 
average.  
3.2 Third Challenge: How to promote employment 
creation more effectively through private sector 
development  
Economic development in Hambantota – a private sector view 
Slow growth and cautious optimism 
Businessmen attending a group discussion convened by the Hambantota 
District Chamber of Commerce (HDCC) confirmed the picture drawn in the 
previous chapter of a low level of economic growth, slow growth in 
employment and in number of business establishments, and little 
differentiation of manufacturing industries during the last decade.18 It was a 
general opinion that growth in Hambantota has been lower than in many 
other districts. One problem is that Hambantota has been a net exporter of 
manpower, and there was a concern among businesspeople and others that 
Hambantota loses its entrepreneurs to other districts, especially to the capital. 
Educated business people start careers in Colombo and settled there, and as 
one businessman commented, “sometimes local businessmen don’t want to 
invest in their region because of responsibilities for relatives”. It is a well-
known problem in small business development that social obligations may 
affect capital accumulation and reinvestment negatively.  
 
There has been a continuation of the agro-based economy that fluctuates with 
weather conditions, and several businessmen reported stagnation in trade due 
to the current drought. Still, there seemed to be a faint optimism as they saw 
signs of a recovery, not least due to the improved political situation. An 
indicator mentioned was that the flow of migrating youth from Hambantota 
seemed to have stalled. Some businessmen found it encouraging that there was 
a keen interest in small enterprises among the youth, which might have to do 
with the problems in the agricultural sector. It may also be possible to 
persuade those with businesses in Colombo to look back home, “because they 
feel a little guilty”, as one commented. The “577 Programme” of the Ministry 
of Southern Development plays on the local patriotism of migrated 
businessmen when encouraging them to “adopt a village” in their home 
district and invest there. 
 
Earlier Hambantota was considered a difficult area, but “not any longer”, as 
one businessman argued. To this effect HIRDEP has made a major 
contribution, according to the businessmen, by improving the transport system 
                                                 
18 The businessmen that attended the meeting were in the following businesses: printing press, 
furniture, retail, bakery, rice milling, motorcycles and spares, jewellery, insurance, restaurant. 
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(the new network of rural roads), developing business organisations, vast 
improvements for women through credit organisations, introducing new 
technology and an opening to the world, introducing practical training 
systems that improve skills, and contributing to a reduction in malaria 
epidemics and general improvements in the health sector. That HIRDEP was 
able to achieve this the businessmen attributed to “good officers coming from 
Colombo to serve here”.  
Constraints to enterprise development  
The private sector of Hambantota consists of micro-, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, mainly catering for the local market. Most enterprises are 
vulnerable to outside competition (goods flowing into the district), as well as 
local competition. Local businessmen identified the main constraints to 
business development in Hambantota as insufficient service facilities, lack of 
skilled people and also a lack of entrepreneurs. Local competition was seen as 
characterised by a “copycat syndrome”: when one business succeeds, new 
businesses pop up selling or producing the same product.  
 
Capital shortage was not mentioned as an important constraint by the 
businessmen, nor by a banker interviewed; but access to credit is quite another 
matter. Especially micro and small enterprises may find doors closed in banks. 
This is due to a lack of collateral and the fact that their systems of 
accountancy do not meet the requirements of the banks. There is thus a need 
for training in business management and accountancy. Several training 
institutes offer such training, but a businessman claimed that there are “no 
good schools as compared to Colombo”. Especially, he complained about the 
computer skills of those trained locally; the courses were too short, only 3 to 6 
months, and there is a lack of proper training equipment. The demand for 
high quality services is a good sign; it indicates a modernising economy.  
 
As regards business development, a banker claimed that there are investment 
opportunities in many sectors.19 The days of big tourist projects are probably 
over in Hambantota, but fisheries can still be lucrative for careful investors. 
Capital is abundant, and remittances from migrants to the Middle East are 
still important to the local economy. Expensive transport and the limited local 
market were considered important constraints, but serious for business 
development is the fact that many small businessmen lack knowledge on 
proper financial planning. To be able to judge how much of what you earn 
you can spend, he found more important than technological skills. Often 
businesspeople start leasing expensive equipment as soon as they earn 
something, and that never works: “The problem is a lack of financial 
discipline. We advise them to go by phases and plan loan repayment. But then 
they just go to another bank”, the banker complained. This problem would 
improve if women were involved: “Women handle business better. Customers 
who go bad, we advise to restructure with the wife as partner. It works!”  
 
The banker warned against optimism; market constraints are there, the small 
local market is easily saturated. An analysis of the market segments of 
                                                 
19 Interview, Jeffrey, Seylan Bank 
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Hambantota would probably reveal a large number of poor people in rural 
villages and towns, a smaller, slowly growing middle class, and a tiny wealthy 
elite, whose demand for some products is local but more domestic for luxury 
goods. Some potential investors, local as well as non-local, have no doubt 
anticipated a continued low buying power, and avoided investments in the 
district. The low level of aggregate demand may thus to some extent have 
protected the local producers from competition.  
 
The micro and small businessmen that target poor consumers experience 
special market constraints to upgrading of their businesses, which may be 
termed “poverty market constraints”. This has a particular relevance to the 
rural crafts of the Social Mobilisation Programme, and is therefore treated in 
the next chapter. The argument, however, may also be valid for some small- 
and medium-sized enterprises: If a product is too costly, the large poverty 
market segment cannot afford it; if the product is cheap, capital accumulation 
and technological upgrading of the enterprise is affected negatively 
(Hesselberg 1981). Neither statistics nor case studies exist that would enable a 
further analysis of the importance of market constraints to growth in the 
district.  
Towards private sector-led development 
A shift in development ideology 
The shift towards neo-liberal thinking during the 1990s strongly influenced 
the last phase of HIRDEP. As stated in chapter 2.1, the Ministry of Policy, 
Planning and Implementation instructed HIRDEP to encourage market-driven 
economic activities, promote investment and facilitate enterprise development 
(HIRDEP 1998). In the pursuit of private sector-led development, emphasis is 
put on the key role of the entrepreneur.  
 
Mobilising entrepreneurship means promoting businesspeople that see 
economic opportunities where others see none, and are willing to take risks. A 
belief in trickle down is evident: Socio-economic development will follow from 
the economic growth that results from promoting private enterprise. Increased 
demand for inputs and growth in employment lead to increased aggregate 
demand, essential for sustained economic growth. What are thought to trickle-
down are primarily jobs and incomes, multiplier effects from investments in 
production. In the context of regional development, it is of importance that 
multiplier effects manifest themselves locally, and that positive effects should 
not be “exported” from the region to other parts of the country or abroad. In 
the latter case, one could rather speak of a trickle out instead of down. 
 
In addition to trickle-down, neo-liberalism also has a strong belief in economic 
growth resulting from competition in a free market. If local industries are 
exposed to non-local competition, they will improve and grow stronger (if 
they survive). Protectionism should therefore be avoided, although welfare 
economists among the neo-liberals are positive towards some forms of 
government incentive to promote industrial development. Private business is 
generally sceptical towards state involvement, and wants less rather than more 
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regulation. But it would be wrong to see the private sector as hostile towards 
government involvement; government regulation should be facilitating rather 
than introducing more constraints to business development. Government 
facilitation of the private sector has in the context of HIRDEP meant creating 
and strengthening supportive institutions. 
The HIRDEP approach: creating a “facilitating network” 
According to the Project Director during the phasing-out period, the emphasis 
on the private sector came in 1995, after the phasing out had started, and this 
spurred within HIRDEP “a struggling with our thinking. There was a mix of 
new and traditional thinking similar to what happened in the 1960s. Some still 
complain to me of these changes.” 20 The role of the planners had to be 
redefined, and project implementation was no longer to be undertaken: “We 
should only facilitate”. In the early 1990s, organisation of the business 
community was a new development, and the HIRDEP Director found it 
“difficult to get the message through”. The different undertakings during this 
period indicate some transitional confusion. On the one hand, attempts were 
made to strengthen institutions aiming at supporting the private sector, in line 
with the role of the state as facilitator; on the other, direct investments in 
manufacturing were made (for the latter, see chapter 3.3).  
 
What was genuinely new during the last period was the strong emphasis on 
employment and income generation over the short term and the role of the 
private sector for development. However, throughout the HIRDEP period 
there was indeed an understanding of the importance of improving conditions 
for production, manifest in both direct measures targeting producers, as well 
as in upgrading infrastructure. Although it is hard to measure to what extent, 
these general improvements no doubt have affected the private sector 
positively.  
 
The foundation for a facilitation role regarding private sector development 
was already there. The leadership of HIRDEP had from the inception of the 
programme developed a flexible approach, which may be termed a 
“facilitating network” approach. At the core of this approach is linking 
together economic actors of the same and different fields in the local 
community and improving information flows between business and 
government institutions. Hence, what happened later, the expansion and 
consolidation of Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce (HDCC), 
should, in terms of development strategy, rather be seen as a continuation 
than as a break.  
The genesis of a chamber of commerce  
The interest in promoting private sector institutions came early into HIRDEP: 
“The seeds were planted in 1986, but we did not know how to do it.” 21 The 
national Entrepreneur Development Programme of the late 1980s supported 
the formation of Entrepreneur District Agencies (EDA) in all districts, but only 
in Hambantota did this initiative prevail, mainly due to HIRDEP’s 
                                                 
20 Interview, Hemachandra. 
21 Interview, Leelasena, REAP 
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involvement. It provided both office space and a manager, and subsequently 
launched the idea of an Enterprise Service Centre (ESC), which was opened in 
1993. In the same year a district level Chamber of Commerce was registered 
by a group of prominent local businessmen, and became the first district 
chamber in the country; only the old Colombo chamber existed at that time.  
 
The ESC was started with the Industrial Development Board as the 
implementing agency, but was privatised in 1996, because, as one observed 
commented, “it did not really make sense to have such an institution in a 
government set-up”.22 It was recognised that the bureaucracy of a state sector 
organisation like the Industrial Development Board severely limited its ability 
to respond to the needs and demands of entrepreneurial services (Atapattu 
2002:16). It was agreed to merge ESC with HDCC. ESC became responsible 
for attracting new financial institutions and for training and organising 
businessmen. NORAD’s support to ESC continued after it became part of 
HDCC. The continued support after its privatisation was aimed at securing 
the sustainability of the entrepreneur development efforts of HIRDEP.  
HIRDEP as a “role model” 
According to the Chairman of HDCC “we are here because of HIRDEP”. 
HIRDEP was instrumental in setting up ESC, but more profoundly HIRDEP 
influenced the development climate of the district. He claimed that even from 
the start, HIRDEP “was running like the private sector office, with no bribes 
to get something done, and there was a high professional standard. If not for 
HIRDEP Hambantota would have been one of the worst districts. Of course, 
HIRDEP could have done better, but that is always possible. But it did what it 
was supposed to do: Employment was distributed among those who needed it 
most.” 23  
 
Another representative of the HDCC also stressed the similarity between the 
institutions of the private sector and the “old Planning Unit” of HIRDEP. He 
claims that “they were very efficient, like us, always working, always open. 
The NORAD funding made Colombo select good staff to satisfy the project. 
That is how the model came into being. This was not an imported model; it 
was a HIRDEP corporate culture of efficiency. Whilst the public sector was 
burdened with bureaucracy and bribes, and everything took time, all that 
changed with Leelasena. He changed the working culture completely. 
Saturdays and Sundays even, he was working. REAP will not develop these 
qualities.” Moreover, he claimed that HIRDEP had made people aware of the 
importance of the private sector, the public as well as the authorities. This has 
paved the way for HDCC, which now can work closely with local authorities 
and get things done fast.24 
HDCC in action  
Generally, the main functions of a chamber of commerce are to support the 
private sector, promote investments and improved financing of business, and 
                                                 
22 Interview, Leelasena, REAP 
23 Interview, Thassim, HDCC 
24 Interview, Ramanayake, HDCC 
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advocate the interests of the private sector with governments and state 
bureaucracies. The lobbying function consists of influencing regulations and 
state investment policies, decisions on infrastructure and channelling of 
investments towards their district. Private sector-friendly regulations are 
advocated. In some parts of the world, the chambers of commerce have 
developed into or merged with employers’ associations, encompassing 
widening functions such as labour-capital relations (wages and codes of 
conduct for work, for instance).  
 
The number of members of HDCC has grown steadily during the last decade; 
there are now around 250 members. They aim for a “high profile”; small 
enterprises are not direct members, but organised through the collective 
membership of their Trade Association. It is possible for non-local investors to 
become members even if the head office is elsewhere; 20 businessmen with 
head offices in Colombo and business in the district are members. Many 
business associations in other towns have looked to HDCC, and use its 
organisation as a model for own activities. There are close contacts between 
the chambers of commerce in the country. 
 
The crucial role of HDCC, according to the Chairman, is to give professional 
support services to the business community, and to sensitise the public of the 
advantages of investing in Hambantota in investors meetings, constantly 
keeping a local viewpoint. A monthly bulletin is produced, there are 
workshops and meetings, and the district is marketed in booklets. During its 
decade of operation, the HDCC has got results: Investments have been 
attracted as a result of their efforts, such as private banks opening branch 
offices. The HDCC sees these banks as important for the business 
development of the district, since they seem less rigid, more efficient and 
flexible than the public ones. Aided by the HDCC, which was present in the 
negotiations, several enterprises have been salvaged from bankruptcy by these 
banks.  
 
The competitive advantages of Hambantota highlighted by HDCC are the 
characteristics of the labour force, the availability of land, and the climate and 
natural beauty that can attract investment in tourism. HDCC has discussed 
the option of securing export processing zone status for investors. Although 
the cost of production in Hambantota might be a problem as compared to 
other Asian locations, there may be other important advantages, such as the 
quality of labour. The general level of education of the workers is suitable for 
unskilled work, and the workers’ behaviour is mainly favourable: “Labour 
quality is good, they are polite to their leaders, not like many other places. 
Behaviour of the workers is good. They treat their boss with respect, stand 
from their seats when he comes, they are punctual, careful not to disturb a 
line. Labour unrest is not seen at all, (such as) sabotage causing closedowns.” 25 
There has been little trade union activity in the district, not even at the 
garment factories, and the trade unions do not have enough members to make 
an impact. However, a new seaport will employ a lot of workers, and then the 
                                                 
25 Interview, Thassim, HDCC. 
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situation may change. Hambantota has a reputation of political radicalism, 
but this radicalism does not seem to extend to the working life. 
 
The Chairman expressed the need for HDCC to encourage greater social 
responsibility among businessmen, and voiced a concern that attitudes are not 
labour conducive. Businessmen are focused on “not to give too many 
benefits”, and frequently do not respect the labour law which sets standards 
regarding working days.  
 
HDCC has also continued the efforts of HIRDEP to improve the construction 
industry by inviting outside investors. Partnership with local companies is 
encouraged, and although not widespread, there are examples of 
subcontracting arrangements. Local construction companies have gradually 
been upgraded and are now capable of handling more advanced technology – 
a process that started with HIRDEP. However, it takes time to deal with the 
attitude of managers and civil servants that to go to Hambantota, you have to 
be transferred: “We tried to get outsiders to stay, shouting ‘please come here’. 
Workers come, but managers from Colombo won’t go”.26 However, there are 
signs that this attitude is now changing: the businessmen we interviewed 
seemed to share the view that “earlier doctors and teachers were reluctant to 
go to Hambantota, now that has changed. During the last 6 years there is a 
vast difference.” 27  
Trade associations coming up 
As mentioned, small enterprises cannot become direct members in HDCC, 
only through membership in trade associations. There are 10 trade 
associations in the district organising a large number of businesspeople. Most 
trade associations are organised geographically, serving all trades within a 
town, but there are also 5 sector associations organising pharmacists, rice 
millers, three-wheeler owners and bus owners. Amongst the advantages that 
the members in sector associations have experienced are that they get raw 
material and technology cheaper when they buy as a group, and that they 
learn about new ways to market and of new training and financial 
opportunities. They gain by co-operating: “There is competition here, yes, but 
not much.” 28  
 
The oldest trade association in Hambantota is 15 years old, Tissahamarama 
Trade Association (TTA), which covers all types of enterprises in the division. 
There are 169 members, and a steering committee of 21. They have two sector 
associations, for three-wheeler owners and drivers of safari cars serving 
tourists to Yala National Park. TTA has encouraged the safari drivers to 
become professional guides, and has arranged seminars. They hope for a 
follow-up: TTA has asked HDCC to arrange more training, covering general 
business skills (marketing, management, banking, taxation, law, accounting). 
“We should also have seminars on tax problems and labour problems; they 
                                                 
26 Interview, Thassim, HDCC. 
27 Businessman, group interview. 
28 Interview, Rathnayaka, HDCC. 
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should know the labour law. There are no trade unions here, since the biggest 
business is only 10-15 employees”.29 
 
To encourage the associations, the HDCC now arranges a competition; the 
prize will be given to the best in terms of growth in membership, special 
activities, monthly reports, regularity of meetings, training activities, 
workshops, the quality of leadership and the assistance given to other trade 
associations. HDCC views the membership of trade associations as very 
valuable: “We can get our horizon widened. They can solve problems locally, 
listen locally and be a pressure group.” 30 
Staying out of “politics”  
It is interesting to note the firm belief expressed by interviewees in the 
necessity and possibility of separating the spheres of business and politics. 
Whereas the business community clearly wanted influence in development, 
hence political, matters, it sought to avoid political interference in business. 
“We want the private sector to take the lead. The government should listen to 
us, not the other way around. And they have started to ask for our advice. 
Ministers do so often, others will follow. But there is no political interference 
in our business, no.” 31  
 
Representatives of the HDCC and a trade association repeatedly stressed the 
neutrality of their organisations. If a businessman used meetings “for political 
purposes”, this would result in his exclusion: “We have contacts with 
politicians, but we don’t want them to be involved. They have not been trying 
either. There are big and small businesspeople in the association. They are 
involved in politics, but not being political inside the association, as this is 
strictly prohibited. Here down South it is known that there have been political 
problems, but not inside the TA. But we have close contacts with the 
politicians, if we need to get something through. It has been functioning well, 
very successful. Of course there’s competition between businessmen in the 
same trade, but inside the TA we are all the same, no difference.” 32  
 
Among the members of the trade associations there are very powerful local 
people with strong links to civil society, Government, and banks, but the 
advice given by HDCC to the associations is uncompromising: “As regards 
politics, keep a distance, but discuss. You should distinguish between the two, 
business and politics. If it is politics you like, you should give up the 
Association.”  
 
It may mean not allowing businessmen to use, for instance, trade association 
meetings to promote their party political agenda. It also implies preventing 
powerful politicians from interfering in business decisions regarding positions 
within the HDCC, or tampering with the rules of the game, for instance in 
tender procedures. Stressing independence probably should be seen as an 
                                                 
29 Interview, Paranagama, TTA. 
30 Interview, Rathnayaka, HDCC. 
31 Interview, Ramanayake, HDCC. 
32 Interview, Paranagama, TTA. 
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attempt at shaking the private sector loose from the grip and whims of the 
politicians, to improve the predictability of their economic environment.  
A “one-stop shop” 
Under the roof of the HDCC building, several private-sector institutions have 
their offices, creating a focal point, a “one-stop shop” for local as well as non-
local businesspeople.  
 
The activities of the Enterprise Service Centre are the most important to the 
local business community. Three types of service are provided: training, 
organising of businessmen, and information dissemination:  
? Conducting training programmes for entrepreneurship development, 
? Organising trade exhibitions, seminars and investment forums, 
? Facilitating the process of securing financial services for business, 
? Establishing and strengthening Trade Associations, 
? Provision of business consultancy services, 
? Dissemination of business services. 
 
According to Atapattu (2002), ESC has rescued and rejuvenated several 
enterprises on the brink of bankruptcy. ESC has assisted with credit 
rescheduling, business planning, introduction of promotional linkages and 
general advice and guidance. ESC was also instrumental in attracting both the 
National Development Bank (NDB) and the Development Finance 
Corporation (DFCC). Both institutions run their mobile offices at the ESC. 
ESC has arranged study tours for businessmen (to India, Malaysia and China), 
with the aim of technology transfer and network building. 
 
The Information Desk is probably the first stop for new businesses to 
Hambantota. This is a GTZ project, aiming at providing market and 
production information to the business community. A monthly newspaper, 
“12 000 villages” is published here. This service is linked to similar offices in 
the other chambers of commerce in the country, and each district office 
specialises in up-to-date information on specific economic sectors. In 
Hambantota, nation-wide databases on fisheries, livestock, paddy and dairy 
are found, and can be accessed on the Internet.33 They aim to link up to the 
database of the Export Development Board. 
 
The Career Service Centre collects information on employment opportunities 
and placements. A Canadian organisation, World University Service (WUSC) 
funds the centre. They register unemployed graduates and match them to a 
potential employer. In an interview, it is decided whether an applicant is suited 
for professional work, or he or she may be referred to vocational training. It is 
undertaken as a service to business, not as “help to the unemployed”. The 
centre does not advertise its services; it runs well on the snowball effect.  
 
According to HDCC, the main role of the International Youth Business Trust, 
a nation-wide project funded by the Prince of Wales Foundation, is to give 
                                                 
33 Information on this project can be found on www.hdcc.lk/about_district.htm . 
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access to credit to the less privileged. It represents a new methodology in 
enterprise development, and has been in operation for the last 5 years. Fifty 
loans of 7500 Rupees have been granted, and they want to expand gradually. 
The applicants are carefully selected, and closely followed up. The recovery of 
loans is 80 percent.  
 
The HDCC also arranges a Vocational Training Consortium, with monthly 
meetings in Hambantota with representatives of key training institutions. The 
rationale is that the institutions need to meet the businesspeople to develop 
relevant education.  
What future role for the new private sector institutions? 
Will HDCC become financially sustainable?  
A future without financial support is continuously discussed at HDCC. One 
strategy for becoming financially independent is to charge the members for the 
services they provide, another is to use the knowledgeable and experienced 
staff to do consultancies. The umbrella organisation of the chambers of 
commerce of the country may also provide opportunities. The main income 
source is the membership fee, which is low to attract and keep members.34 The 
policy of HDCC is to increase fees very gradually; as the members experience 
its usefulness for their businesses, they will be willing to pay more. According 
to the chairman of TTA, the drought conditions and the general economic 
situation of the district does not allow for an increase in fees right now. So far, 
HDCC earns between 10 and 15 per cent of its costs, of which the staff cost 
comprises two thirds. The plan is to cover 30 per cent in three years. 
 
It is possible for HDCC to access public funding for training that is provided, 
but again it was stressed that political independence was crucial for the 
continued existence of the HDCC. The emphasis on independence is 
interesting, and should be studied in terms of changes in the political culture 
of Hambantota. A hypothesis is that the policy of independence turns the 
balance of power towards the business community. If efforts are made to do 
away with corruption at the same time, one may speak of a modernising 
political culture.  
Will local business benefit from foreign investment? 
The talk of the town in Hambantota is the new, huge foreign direct 
investments. There are plans for a container harbour, an airport, an oil 
refinery, and several other investments that have already been approved by 
Government.35 According to the Board of Investment, due to the sea depth 
                                                 
34 The enrolment fee for single members is 1000 Rupees, and the annual fee is the same. The 
fee for trade associations is 1500 Rupees, as is the annual fee. At workshops fees are 150 for 
single members and 200 Rupees for trade associations, which is very low compared to similar 
workshops at the Chamber of Commerce in Colombo. There, members are charged 3000 
Rupees to attend, and the chamber earns a profit from workshops and seminars. 
35 According to Board of Investment (BOI), 35 new investments (some domestic, mostly 
foreign) have been approved in 2002, including garments and shoes; tourist industry; 
tanneries; agro-industries, fisheries; other manufacturing (including ship-breaking, 
engineering, bricks, plastics, chemicals). It is not clear how many of the projects will be built.  
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close to shore, Hambantota is the perfect location of a harbour to serve some 
of the 35 000 ships that yearly pass by the southern tip of the country. The 
Chinese oil refinery has selected Hambantota for similar reasons; the plan is to 
ship in crude, and ship out refined oil. The airport is planned to reduce the 
pressure on the airports of Bangkok and Singapore. The new developments 
may create considerable employment, and may also necessitate the extension 
of the new Southern Highway into Hambantota. Planners also envisage a new 
inland business and administrative centre, since the space for expansion of 
Hambantota town is limited. 
 
The business community of Hambantota seems positive, and considers the 
new investments great opportunities for development of the smaller 
enterprises. They seem not to fear competition: “it’s what all are waiting for”. 
HDCC also supports the investments and has had a role as a “Hambantota 
lobby” in getting some of them. The role of the local private sector is to 
supply inputs, services and goods to the new enterprises, and consumer goods 
to their employees. HDCC claims that local investors will seize the 
opportunities, but the challenge is to ensure that the spin-offs stay in 
Hambantota: Do the local businesses match the needs of big enterprises; can 
they become future partners? Are the types and quality of services and 
products that are produced locally sufficiently sophisticated?  
 
The role of HDCC is to secure a trickle-down instead of a trickle-out. HDCC 
searches to attract non-local investments, but to serve the interest of their 
(local) members, they need to ensure that at least some multiplier effects stay 
in the district. This can be done through encouraging linkages between foreign 
and local investors. Such network formation is crucial in facilitating sub-
contracting arrangements and fostering a greater propensity among the new 
entrants, who may be inclined to be outward looking in their supply strategies, 
to buy local products.  
What about poverty reduction?  
The title of this chapter is “Creating new economic opportunities for the 
poor”; evidently, a discussion on what role the institutions that facilitate 
private sector development can play in poverty eradication is called for. The 
only reference made to the poor is in conjunction with the trickle-down 
mechanism. There are, probably, poor people who can escape poverty through 
the promotion of private sector development. A family member may get a job, 
or, in very exceptional cases, a poor person may create his or her own job 
through entrepreneurship. However, it is our firm belief that poverty 
alleviation of the magnitude needed in Hambantota cannot be left to the 
market mechanism through the promotion of the private sector. Thus, the 
question should be posed differently: Can and should institutions such as the 
HDCC play a direct role in poverty alleviation?  
 
The origin of the institution in question, HDCC, is different from that of other 
chambers of commerce. Normally, such institutions emerge as the effort of the 
private sector itself. HDCC, on the other hand, was born a planner’s idea, and 
raised in a planners’ environment in HIRDEP. This legacy may result in a role 
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conflict. HIRDEP’s mandate, to improve the living conditions of the 
inhabitants of the District, was much wider than what a chamber of commerce 
can have. The contribution of HDCC to reaching such a goal can only be 
indirect: What is good for the private sector is good for the poor. Whether 
that is the case is an empirical question – it may or may not be true.  
 
Stating that the aim is to become a powerful institution that speaks for the 
interests of the private sector – primarily, the top 150 enterprises of the 
District – is an attempt at coming to terms with the HIRDEP legacy. In this 
manner they may avoid legitimising any government’s lack of responsibility 
for poverty eradication. We should not be surprised if a politician came up 
with the excellent solution that “we don’t need special programmes for the 
poor, it’s all taken care of by the private sector”. It is not the job of HDCC to 
deal with poverty eradication, but it is good if their efforts contribute to this 
aim. This has implications for whether HDCC should also take care of the 
interests of micro-enterprises, which is briefly touched upon in the next 
chapter.  
Do what you’re good at 
Determining “company policy”, spelling out what role HDCC intends to play 
in future, is of utmost importance with internationalisation emerging. The 
least controversial is the role as provider of independent business advice for 
“everybody”. Taking care of the local member’s interests may be somewhat 
more problematic as the economy becomes more international; when big 
business knocks on the front door, conflicting aims slip in the back door. 
Added to such dilemmas comes donor dependency. How free is HDCC to 
decide its future when dependent upon donor funding? A well-functioning 
institution targeting private sector development is a magnet for donors, some 
of which have their own agendas, advising “everybody” to “become 
entrepreneurs”. Sometimes good business advice is not to do business. In 
Hambantota, any potential entrepreneur should carefully consider the 
limitations of the poverty market.  
 
HDCC should be advised to “do what you’re good at”: Cultivate its role as a 
business organisation; continue as a voice of Hambantota; and promote the 
interests of the local private sector versus politicians, the bureaucracy and 
foreign investors. Enhance social responsibility among business people; 
continue to speak for decent wages and working conditions for the labourers. 
That is building on the best of the HIRDEP tradition. 
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3.3 Fourth Challenge: How to sustain people’s 
organisations that strengthen poor people’s 
capabilities for income generation – the case of SMF 
Fighting poverty through empowerment 
The Social Mobilisation Programme 
This programme, initiated by HIRDEP, is an attempt at fighting poverty 
through empowerment of people. Some organisational aspects, strengths and 
weaknesses of the programme are treated here, with an emphasis on the 
phasing-out period of the NORAD support, a period which saw shifts in 
ideology and policy directly influencing the organisational set-up and the 
activities of the organisation. The organisation is still very active, facing 
challenges of a changing economic environment in addition to those formed 
by the transition from a government to a non-government organisation.36 
 
The implementation of a social mobilisation programme within HIRDEP 
started in 1986. It was a pioneering initiative, facilitated by the shift from a 
conventional sectoral to an integrated approach with emphasis on process 
planning. The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, aiming at addressing the basic 
needs of the poor through savings and micro-credit, was the model. The 
organisation was a simple, two-tier structure, where small Groups at the 
lowest level formed Self-Banking Societies at the highest. In 1996, the 
structure was changed into a three-tier one, when the two institutions at the 
district level, the Social Mobilisation Foundation (SMF) and the Banking 
Union were introduced.37 Several other district-level bodies were formed at the 
same time: a Training Unit, an Agriculture & Livestock Development Unit, an 
Enterprise Development Unit and a Leasing Unit. SMF is governed by a Board 
of Directors and guided by an Advisory Committee. As regards leadership at 
the lower levels, the Groups often claim that they have a “spokesperson” 
rather than a leader, usually the one that is the best writer among them. The 
Self-Banking Society leadership is formal, consisting of a President, a Finance 
Manager and a Secretary. The Finance Manager has the heaviest workload; 
some managers claim that they spend more than 2 hours per day on 
administration, and few Group members seem willing to take on such a 
                                                 
36 This chapter builds on Dale (2002) for the understanding of organisational aspects as well 
as the strengths and the weaknesses of the programme. Dale undertook theoretical and 
empirical studies of the organisation during the 1990s and in 2000-2. The Evaluation Team’s 
discussions with Group members, Social Mobilisers, the SMF leadership and other key 
informants form the basis to understanding the changes of policy during the 1990s. The 
reports by Atapattu (2002), Lakshman (2002) and Hewavitharana (2002) on the HIRDEP 
phase-out period supplement this information. 
37 The formation of a comprehensive district-level structure can be seen as a continuation of 
the Federation of Self-Banking Societies that had been formed in some divisions for the 
purpose of providing bigger loans than the Self-Banking Societies could give. The Federation 
was terminated with the formation of SMF. The Banking Union at the district level was 
thought to have a branch in each division (Dale 2002). 
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responsibility. None of these office-holders are paid; Dale (2002) considers 
this a major future challenge of the organisation. 
 
SMF was started as a government organisation under HIRDEP and is 
currently registered as an NGO. The number of members has increased 
steadily, and the savings fund is now (in April 2002, according to Atapattu 
2002) close to 45 million Rupees. In October 2001 there were 340 registered 
Self-Banking Societies in Hambantota District, with a total of 13 500 
members. Only one person per household can become a Group member, 
which means that the programme involves close to 70 000 household 
members, constituting about 12 per cent of the population of the District 
(Atapattu 2002).  SMF claims that the number of members now is 17 000 (in 
October 2002). The number of members in each group varies between 3 and 
10, but most groups have between 5 and 7 members. The number of groups in 
each self-banking society varies between 4 and 9. Most members are women, 
over 90 per cent according to Dale (2002). In recent years, the programme has 
experienced competition from another organisation that has been recruiting 
members for similar activities in the District. 
Mobilising the poor 
The outcome of a social mobilisation process should ideally be a “slow but 
steady progress through self-reflection, augmented individual confidence, 
increased mutual strength, gradual accumulation of the members’ own 
financial resources, and strict organisational and financial discipline” (Dale 
2002:78). According to these criteria, the HIRDEP social mobilisation 
programme can, to a large extent, be viewed as successful. The role of the 
Social Mobilisers (in similar programmes often termed change agents) is 
crucial; the aim is to set in motion people’s own abilities and resources to 
improve their living conditions. The ideology of the Social Mobilisers is one of 
social equality, and an aim is to help disadvantaged people against oppression. 
Forming strong groups implies enhancing individual confidence as well as 
strengthening solidarity among the members. Within development paradigms 
such as “alternative development” or “development from below”, such 
mobilisation strategies are central.  
 
The Social Mobilisers were financed through HIRDEP and thus placed under 
the Director’s leadership. The Directors have played a very important role 
encouraging the Social Mobilisers, and shaping the overall strategy of the 
organisation. The programme therefore can, paradoxically, be considered a 
“bottom-up development strategy initiated from above”. Even today, when 
the SMF is formally an NGO, there is a strong sense of ownership of the 
programme at the office earlier known as the “Planning Unit”. 
 
Apart from an initial contribution to the Self-Banking Societies by HIRDEP 
and the financing of Social Mobilisers by NORAD, the programme is self-
financing. The fact that it is the members’ own money that enables the 
improvements should be kept constantly in mind, as should the fact that 
voluntary work, transparency in transactions and mutual trust among 
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members, and between leadership and members, are essential for the 
continuation of the programme. 
Results 
Measuring the achievements of the Social Mobilisation Programme 
immediately raises the question of which yardsticks to use. The meetings we 
had with group members, learning about their experiences and their views, 
inspire us first to treat the issue of empowerment. As a result of their 
involvement in the organisation, the members have started to reflect more 
deeply upon their own situation. The Social Mobilisers encourage them to 
search for opportunities to improve their situation, and to get a clearer 
understanding of potentials and constraints. Facing up to their problems and 
looking for ways to deal with them seem to have boosted self-confidence. 
According to Atapattu (2002), an indicator of this is increased demand for 
services in the fields of agriculture and livestock, health and nutrition and 
family planning.  
 
It should be kept in mind that the target group is very poor people, mostly 
women who had hardly ever attended formal meetings or taken an active part 
in financial transactions of this nature previously. They are now requested to 
attend meetings on a regular basis, and inform the other members if they 
cannot attend. The Group meetings are held weekly, meetings of the Self-
Banking Societies monthly. According to Dale (2002), most members have 
gained varied benefits from the programme, acquiring “greater understanding 
of social structures and the surrounding society, ability to manage household 
resources more wisely, organisation-related knowledge, greater self-confidence 
and self-assertion, and eradication of a feeling of inferiority (as local citizens 
and as women)” (:106). Generally, the husbands of the female group members 
have been supportive; in a few cases, the Social Mobilisers had to explain the 
benefits more thoroughly to avoid major disagreement. 
 
Individual capacities and freedom were improved, but the benefit most 
emphasised by the members in Dale’s (2002) study was increased economic 
security (for instance, knowing that funds can be made available quickly if 
someone falls ill). The member households’ social networks were widened, 
leading to increased social security. Often, the group members help each other, 
for instance by exchanging labour, or in crisis situations. Both the Group 
members and the Social Mobilisers mentioned solidarity and loyalty as traits 
of the organisation. The formation of a group identity through the spread of 
the SMF logo and through cultural activities involving members was very 
visible in the Weeraketiya SMF exhibition that the Evaluation Team attended. 
The informants also mentioned increased communal harmony as a major 
benefit of the programme: gossiping is reduced when more important matters 
are discussed frequently. In the discussion, a Social Mobiliser argued that two 
aims were equally important: “There should be both, improvements in living 
standards and in women’s status”. Empowerment of women should be 
measured in terms of economic upliftment, and during the last decade they 
had seen some improvement in living standards: “Quality of life has been 
improved for our members.” 
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What loans are used for 
The Social Mobilisation Programme is a savings and credit programme, 
aiming at economic upliftment of the poor. Putting a small amount of money 
aside every week has in the long run resulted in the possibility of obtaining 
loans. Most members have taken loans for various purposes during their 
membership period, and been able to repay them within 4 or 5 months. The 
repayment rate is very high, partly due to strict financial discipline and 
(informal) group sanctions. Full transparency is secured through lengthy 
discussions of loan purposes and their repayment conditions during the 
meetings where members present their applications (Dale 2002).  
 
The members save to get credit. The savings accumulate in funds, either 
Group or Self-Banking Society funds. Any surplus (formed when the demand 
for loans is low) is normally deposited in fixed deposit accounts in banks, or 
transferred to the Banking Union. The latter gives a higher interest (12 per 
cent) than commercial banks, which currently give 9.5 per cent. Most Self-
Banking Societies also allow voluntary savings, if a member has the ability, 
wants to see results faster or wants a bigger loan. The weekly contribution to 
the fund, 5 or 10 Rupees, may seem a small amount, but some of the members 
interviewed now face problems in raising even this due to the drought. In a 
few instances, members may contribute to the savings fund in kind, such as 
collected coconut shells, which can be sold. The activities are run at very low 
cost; the only income sources are interest on loans and bank deposits. SMF at 
district level earns a profit from the Leasing Unit, which leases production and 
transport equipment (three-wheelers, tractors, carpentry machines, sewing 
machines, motorcycles, grinding machines) to customers. 
 
Obtaining loans without any other collateral than savings, and the very low 
interest rate, are major advantages of the credit programme. The interest rate 
is 2 per cent as compared to the rates of some of their alternative financing 
institutions, which may be between 10 to 20 per cent monthly. Often, the only 
option of the very poor is the informal credit market in times of crisis. An 
encouraging result of the programme is that many members have liberated 
themselves from the grip of the moneylenders, using low interest loans from 
the programme to repay such debts (Dale 2002).  
 
The members decide themselves for what purposes loans should be given. 
Generally, non-members cannot get loans. A high degree of flexibility is 
demonstrated; loans are granted for immediate consumption (medical 
expenses, food, household utensils), investment in housing (which is a 
controversial topic among members), and investment in productive activities. 
About half of the loans are utilised for production, consumption is the second 
most important, and housing comes third. Individual activities are preferred; 
there are few examples of collective production projects, but more examples of 
collective purchase of consumer goods or production inputs. Half of the loans 
taken directly from Group funds are used for consumption, whereas loans 
from the Self-Banking Societies are mainly used for production purposes (Dale 
2002). The success of the programme may partly be explained by this 
flexibility – loans for purposes that the participants themselves define as 
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“urgently important”, satisfying day-to-day needs, are granted. Secondly, the 
fact that the money may be spent for purposes that are not visible in the 
application, termed the “fungibility of resources”, may be another part of the 
explanation.  
A turbulent phasing-out period 
Institutional changes  
As stated above, the Social Mobilisation Programme was fundamentally 
changed in 1996. The umbrella organisation at district level, SMF, was 
formed, together with the Banking Union and the units aiming at sectoral 
development. Dale (2002) is critical of the formation of the Foundation at 
district level. He views the changes as “efforts at diversification and hierarchy 
building” (84), and claims that it demonstrates the democratic deficiency of 
the organisation: “The whole construct of district-level units and divisional 
branches … has been managed entirely from above, by … the HIRDEP 
Directors and, to increasing extents, persons recruited as staff of the SMF” 
(86).  
 
The changes have many causes; the activities had spread to many divisions of 
the district during the decade, and it may seem a natural next step to have a 
forum to discuss experiences and strategies. More important, however, was 
that NORAD had decided to withdraw support, and the HIRDEP Director at 
that time looked for ways to sustain the Programme. It was worth saving, the 
results were promising. The first step was to transform the organisation into 
an NGO; and measures had to be taken to cover expenses after the phasing-
out period. The income of the organisation at district level had to cover the 
wages of the Social Mobilisers. By this time, the ideology of the dynamic role 
of the private sector in development had reached Hambantota (see previous 
chapter). The formation of the Enterprise Development Unit of SMF in 1996 
should be seen in the light of this shift; this unit were given a special role in 
sustaining SMF activities. 
A not-so-wise choice of doing business 
The emphasis on private sector development – fostering entrepreneurship, 
facilitating capital accumulation – generally goes together with privatisation of 
state enterprises. In Hambantota, however, HIRDEP created a hybrid strategy 
during the mid-1990s by actively promoting what may be termed a “state-
driven industrialisation effort”. Altogether 21 enterprises were started and 
handed over to SMF. A bold experiment it was, and generally regarded a 
failure. Today, none of these businesses are retained by SMF, whose 
ownership was short-lived (1998-1999). In 1999, they were transferred to the 
Ministry of Southern Region Development and thereafter taken over by 
private investors and NGOs. According to the former HIRDEP Director, who 
was instrumental in the formation of the enterprises (and deeply involved in 
the running of them), 12 were still profitable in 1999, and went bankrupt 
later. A Social Mobiliser, however, claimed that none of the enterprises were 
successful: “The cost was too high, it had to stop”. 
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Initially, the concept was one of private sector partnership ; the enterprises 
should be run as joint ventures with experienced local businessmen. It is thus 
an example of innovative thinking in HIRDEP at that time. When partnerships 
failed to materialise, HIRDEP decided to run the enterprises. The 
establishment of enterprises served a triple purpose: firstly, they should create 
employment based on the exploitation of local resources; secondly, they 
should employ educated youth (graduates) as managers of businesses, as part 
of a centrally-planned initiative designed to reduce political unrest in 
Hambantota; and thirdly, when the decision was made to hand the enterprises 
over to SMF, they were supposed to create income to sustain SMF activities at 
district level (for instance, to finance Social Mobilisers when NORAD support 
was withdrawn). 
 
The Social Mobilisers debated the wisdom in SMF owning and running 
enterprises, but the decision was not theirs nor the grassroots members’ to 
make; HIRDEP decided. According to SMF informants, SMF was “owner in 
name only”, as the real owner and manager was the HIRDEP Director. The 
relationship between HIRDEP and SMF seems to have been one of unequal 
decision-making power where the HIRDEP Directors had the stronger 
position, due to their position as “employer” and because they possessed 
greater resources in terms of knowledge. A probable hypothesis is that 
dependency and even submission have characterised the relationship.  
The SMF enterprises  
The types of enterprise started demonstrate a deliberate focus on the resource 
base of the district; most of them were agro-based.38 Some enjoyed subsidies 
such as free buildings and some transport. The enterprises also capitalised, 
according to a former employee, on the team spirit of the Social Mobilisation 
Programme as well as the HIRDEP “company culture”. The latter means in 
this context “deliver, be punctual, keep your word as regards orders and you 
will keep your market, work hard, the whole night if necessary”. Some of the 
workers in the SMF enterprises were recruited from among SMF household 
members, and a sense of ownership may have developed, conducive for 
enhanced labour productivity. Long working hours and unpaid overtime is the 
darker, “self-exploitation” side of the sense of ownership.  
 
Some of the enterprises went well, and escaped the management and 
bureaucracy problems inherent in state enterprises. This may be caused by the 
unusual – for a government institution – leadership style of HIRDEP. Sound 
economic sense was also demonstrated when the decision was made to hand 
the enterprises over to the Ministry of Southern Region Development; SMF 
kept the profitable Leasing Unit and also tried to secure a share of future 
profits from the enterprises handed over.  
                                                 
38 The enterprises that were started were production of chalk, curd, hand-made paper, 
grinding mills, goat breeding, leasing, showroom of SMF products, bakery, dehydration, 
vegetable collection centre, vegetable farm, organic fertiliser, lime, poultry production, 
cashew, curd plot, ceramics, sahana stall, fish production and the Thala Kerali project 
(information from the SMF Enterprise Division). 
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Questions unanswered 
Why the businesses ultimately failed, and when, we do not know. It is not 
documented which companies were profitable or non-profitable at the time of 
the transfer, why they ran at profit or loss, the extent of subsidies given, 
whether labour productivity was low or high, the rationale for 
“privatisation”, who decided who should take over; in short, it is impossible 
to conclude.  
 
What we do know is that some former employees are dissatisfied with the 
process of transfer, and claim that SMF lost economic opportunities. 
Politicians gave the companies to their friends and good businessmen in the 
private sector did not get a fair chance. Political interference and corruption 
led to their failure; the new owners had neither the knowledge nor the spirit to 
run them, they claim. Another informant also pointed to management failure, 
but during the period they were run by HIRDEP, since few of the managers 
were trained in business management. Others pointed to the crucial role of the 
hard-working HIRDEP Director; the enterprises relied too much upon a single 
person. When he left for another position, all fell apart. Moreover, a lack of 
knowledge of markets may have contributed to the failure, since the feasibility 
studies were of low quality (if they existed at all). The products therefore faced 
too hash a competition or local bottlenecks.  
 
However, when twenty businesses in different sectors, some even profitable 
ones, fail during a very short time period, many causes are at work, and no 
firm conclusions can be drawn without a detailed empirical investigation. 
Improved knowledge of this failed industrialisation attempt may provide 
insights into several dimensions of development in Hambantota, the political 
and economic constraints of enterprise development in particular. 
“Private sector development is coming – we must be willing to 
change” 
Promoting entrepreneurship 
In a group discussion, Social Mobilisers related that the enterprise adventure 
has not damaged its reputation; nobody had heard that “projects run by 
women are doomed to fail”. There is too much evidence against such a claim 
in Hambantota! And the leadership of SMF is not afraid of putting even more 
emphasis on business development in future. The plan is to improve the 
income-generating activities that the members are currently engaged in, and 
encourage the members to become entrepreneurs, to move from micro-
enterprises to small-scale and medium ones.  
 
The SMF Board had started a discussion of the challenge of free enterprise, 
and how to link up the members to private businessmen in order to improve 
their knowledge of business: “Private sector development is coming. We must 
be willing to change. … We do take the advice from members of the Chamber 
of Commerce.” They would also welcome a division for dealing with micro-
enterprises at the Chamber. A Social Mobiliser also stressed the need to renew 
the strategy and prepare the members for tougher times: “In the existing open 
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market system we cannot ignore competition.” However, the new focus does 
not involve a complete u-turn; SMF plans to continue the well-functioning 
credit system for the poorer people: “We must do things through the 
grassroots level, start small scale and gradually build up”.  
Income-generating activities  
Projects that fall into a broad category of “investments in agriculture” are the 
most common income-generation activity so far (Table 3). The investments are 
made in coconut, tea, citronella, livestock and other production (including 
water for paddy). Agro-related processing is also important, sweets, spices, 
milk products and leather products are attracting investment, and there are 
also a few investments in fish processing. Manufacturing, comprising pottery, 
dressmaking and jewellery, is an important activity, as are construction 
(carpentry and masonry), retail and mobile trade.  
 
 
Table 3  Income-generating activity according to sector 
  Loans given up to March 2002 
Sector Loans Percentages 
Agriculture 
Trade 
Other manufacturing 
Construction 
Agro-related processing 
2467 
858 
733 
502 
343 
50 
17 
15 
10 
7 
Total 4903 99 
Based on Atapattu (2002, Table 12) and data from the SMF Enterprise Division  
 
 
According to the SMF Board, the success of the Leasing Unit shows that there 
is a need for bigger loans; altogether 175 loans for leasing transport and 
production equipment have been granted. This has improved economic 
activities. The SMF Board was positive that the loan limit of 50 000 Rupees 
was too low, and since Self-Banking Societies cannot give bigger loans, the 
Banking Union should play a more important role in future. They underlined 
that this is a demand from below, the members find it necessary, and "we 
must respond to the demand from the grassroots”. The Social Mobilisers 
agreed that the demand for bigger loans comes from below: “Yes, because 
some want to expand their businesses to a higher level. Most of the members 
are women, and some demand loans to carry on their business, others to 
expand. They are confident that they can get more profit with bigger loans. 
Some tried to go to commercial banks, but had no success. … The Social 
Mobiliser also can identify who in a group can be a successful 
businesswoman. So it’s OK to provide this credit. They also discuss with their 
husbands whether to start an enterprise. There are many who want to 
expand.” Training of members in business management is the key component 
of this policy, and the SMF Board plans to train Social Mobilisers firstly so 
they can motivate the members: “We must make sure that the trainers are very 
good; we want more donor money to improve training.” 
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Add training, stir, and there’s the entrepreneur? 
The training programme that seems to have inspired the thrust towards the 
cultivation of entrepreneurial spirit is the course in business management given 
by Competency Based Economy through Formation of Enterprise, CEFE. This 
is a GTZ initiative, covering 150 countries so far. In Hambantota, 21-day-
courses started in 1996, and later the number of days was reduced to 15. The 
SMF Board views the course as useful; it will secure a more professional 
attitude towards business among the members. The course covers marketing, 
production, management, entrepreneurship, how to select a good business, 
costing, pricing, progress reports – all in 15 days. The SMF Board has so far 
sent 24 Social Mobilisers (21 women, 3 men) to the course, and wants to 
expand this to encompass 56 of the Self-Banking Societies. The Social 
Mobilisers that undergo such training can call themselves “Entrepreneur 
Development Officers”, the SMF Board enthusiastically stated. The target for 
2003 is that 200 members become entrepreneurs. 
 
A Social Mobiliser stressed that the demand for training comes from the 
grassroots level, “then we put forward this idea to the SMF office, which 
contacted the CEFE. HIRDEP provided money to this institution and they 
provided the training.” Other participants of the group discussion did not 
question this statement, and one added that they were asked what kind of 
training they needed before the course started. Most members wanted to learn 
accounting, management and bookkeeping. Also, they wanted to understand 
markets, how to find a good market, how to deal with competition and 
produce quality goods. 
 
However, HDCC (chamber of commerce, see previous chapter) is somewhat 
sceptical as regards the possibility of producing entrepreneurs by sending a 
large number of applicants to training courses.39 Maybe economic opportunity 
creates the entrepreneur – and not the other way around? They have 
experienced that training 30 may result in 5 or 6 attempts to start something; 
should a potential winner be “picked” and given more thorough training 
instead?  
Complementary or contradictory visions? 
What have characterised the Social Mobilisation Programme from the start are 
flexibility regarding the use of savings, emphasis on gradual improvement, 
voluntary work, transparency, solidarity and mutual trust. It may be termed a 
combined survival and productive investment strategy, in which accumulation 
of savings that are used for consumption is considered to be as valuable as 
those used for productive investment. With a greater focus on enterprise 
development, “unproductive” use of savings for consumption purposes may 
come under attack. The next step may be that potentially successful members 
are targeted in a picking of winners strategy. However, the SMF Board may 
succeed in their attempts at riding both horses; the strategies may be 
complementary rather than contradictory. But it is also possible that a gap 
                                                 
39 Interview, Rathnayaka, HDCC. 
C M I  
 64 
may develop if the members keep a “gradual and safe” profile and the leaders 
pursue a “fast and risky” strategy.  
 
What kind of organisation do the members want, and how does it match the 
visions of the leaders? In future, will the change agents be termed “Social 
Mobilisers” or “Entrepreneur Development Officers” – or both? Five actors 
are important in shaping the future of the organisation: members, Social 
Mobilisers, SMF leaders, the Government and donors. Whose voices will be 
strongest? Referring to the relationship between government institutions and 
SMF, a Social Mobiliser claimed, “We are independent. The Board makes the 
decisions”. This is formally the case, but strong linkages seem to be kept up 
through the Advisory Committee. There were also critical comments on 
politics: “We must avoid political interference; expel members if they try to 
misuse the organisation for political purposes”. Another comment shows 
awareness of a possible gap between the members and the top of the 
hierarchy: “But members do not really think the Bank Union belongs to 
them”. When asked if they take part in the debate on the future of SMF, the 
Social Mobilisers answered: “All policy decisions are taken by the Board but 
as a democratic organisation they are concerned with the ideas at the 
grassroots”, and “All decisions are taken on behalf of the people by the 
Board.” This way, decision-making is “bottom up”, they claim. The members’ 
voices are probably heard through the Social Mobilisers, but to what extent 
do they influence policy decisions? The loyalty of the Social Mobilisers may 
also be split between the grassroots and the leadership.  
An inevitable outcome? 
According to the SMF Board, the most enterprising women may leave the 
organisation unless bigger loans are provided, and this will weaken the 
organisation. The SMF Board was aware of the increased risk of granting 
bigger loans; but greater risk means greater potential reward. Applicants for 
bigger loans are carefully selected, based on education, experience and 
attitude, and they will have to undertake a training programme. However, the 
SMF Board did not mention the consequences for the organisation if they stay 
and have great success in business. We raised this question with the Social 
Mobilisers, referring to an example: Some women in a group had more success 
in business than others, resulting in increased divergence of living standard 
among the members, and “a couple of the poorest earlier members said that it 
would no longer be possible for them to participate … since they could not 
even invite those who had become ‘rich’ to their houses anymore!” (Dale 
2002:77) The Social Mobiliser that responded to this question played down its 
implications: “There is no reason (for them) to feel bad, it is an 
encouragement if someone comes up because of collective effort. One should 
not look down upon others. The small Group is built upon that spirit. And 
they are doing different things, some cultivate, some are in business, they do 
not compete.” Another Social Mobiliser agreed: “Most of the groups have a 
very good ‘feeling of unity’. They help each other in a friendly way.”  
 
However, with economic success greater social stratification follows, and the 
key question is whether this is seen as the outcome of collective effort or 
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individual. Socio-economic differentiation may put a strain on feelings of 
unity; solidarity and individualism may not go well together. But Dale does 
not think that differentiation will necessarily lead to social discord or other 
social problems: “Those who become better off than others should feel 
welcome to stay on in their organisations, whether for egoistic or altruistic 
reasons (or some combination). However, one should not promote a system in 
which those relatively few who will require much bigger loans than others 
(say, over 50,000 Rupees) should have a ‘right’ to get these from the funds of 
these organisations. That would disrupt the solidarity platform on which they 
are built and, I am sure, have negative consequences for organisational culture 
and the interests of the majority. Instead, such persons must be assisted (if 
they need to be so) to make use of other facilities, either as supplement to or in 
replacement of the money they can get within their organisations.” 40 
The Future  
When you dream, dream big? 
To recruit new members and keep the old, the members must experience 
improved social and economic security, and empowerment. Already it has 
become more difficult to recruit new members: “Yes, there are fewer asking 
for membership every year. The biggest problem is the competition from other 
NGOs at the grassroots level. We don’t have enough staff, and the area is big. 
But we will continue, we have had success. We can expand to more villages 
and strengthen the organisation. Maybe we have 25 000 members in 5 
years.” 41  
 
Discussing the strengthened focus on entrepreneurship, Atapattu (2002) warns 
against the greater risks involved: “Great care must be taken not to push poor 
people into risky investments, at least without some basic safeguards.” (16). 
He calls for a broad-based and systematic approach to developing these 
activities, involving “a combination of exploration of opportunities, 
facilitation and training of members, loans and possibly some insurance 
arrangements. No blue print exists for this; a differentiated strategy is needed 
to address the needs of people who do not have an aptitude for business, are 
risk averse and therefore likely to cling to their traditional occupations and 
those few displaying entrepreneurial talents.” (Atapattu 2002:16).  
 
This warning is important, but it should be kept in mind that any “fluffy idea” 
– such as the promotion of entrepreneurship by “training market” actors such 
as CEFE – may fall flat if it meets sound scepticism at the grassroots level. The 
down-to-earth attitude of the members diminishes the danger that grandiose 
leaders may gamble with poor people’s money, but only democratic 
procedures can prevent it. We asked if the Social Mobilisers feared the 
consequences of exposing the members to a greater risk, but were (rightfully) 
reminded that the members in question have a mind of their own: “We are 
confident that they can decide for themselves if they should take the risk.” The 
Groups and SMF had banked savings. When members still are reluctant to 
                                                 
40 Interview, Dale, AIT. 
41 Interview, Social Mobiliser. 
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invest, this may appear as “risk aversion”. However, it may also be analysed 
in terms of sound economic sense, and valuable carefulness in a situation with 
no insurance of the funds generated through collective effort.  
 
The members’ careful consideration, even reluctance, before starting new 
enterprises are probably well founded. There may be many in the same 
business, and an increasingly open, very slowly growing economy, and thus a 
limited local market: “The problem of market saturation of village craft 
products is very real,” according to a banker interviewed. “They are advised 
to produce, but do not think of the marketing side.” 42 Another line of advice 
was given by an insurance broker: “I know their activities; I am impressed by 
their savings, but the ladies should not invest directly in their own business. 
Fifty thousand is not very much to spend, but a lot to lose. If they invest, they 
should diversify.” 43  
Poverty market constraints 
Most of the economic activities invested in by the Group members are micro-
enterprises; some can be classified as small-scale. Many can be termed crafts, 
and it is a crux of thought that rural crafts still survive in Hambantota, against 
many odds. Using the word survive indicates that we expect them to vanish; 
and in fact, that has been the case in many developing countries when artisan 
production has been exposed to competition from industrial goods. Artisan 
production in the district is characterised by family labour, low levels of 
technology and generally, low quality products as compared, for instance, to 
imported industrial goods.  
 
In a study based on fieldwork undertaken in 1979, Hesselberg (1981) argues 
that artisan production in Hambantota is reproduced largely because of 
characteristics of the market it serves. He terms this a poverty market where 
low quality products are supplied to local consumers with very low purchasing 
power. To cater for the poverty market, the price of the product must be as 
low as possible; capital accumulation necessary for technological upgrading is 
thus difficult. As soon as people become better off, they demand higher quality 
goods that are produced using better technology, such as imported goods. And 
if the artisan accumulates enough to upgrade the technology and compete with 
the quality of imported goods, the price of the product will have to increase to 
cover the costs – and the product is out of reach of the poverty market 
segment of the population. The middle-income market segment is then 
targeted. At this market segment, local artisans find it very hard to compete. 
This way, the reproduction of rural crafts is linked to the reproduction of the 
poverty market; whether artisans continue their trade depends on the 
continued existence of the poor.  
 
More than twenty years have passed since this study was undertaken, and the 
continued existence of rural crafts indicate the continued existence of poverty 
and a slowly growing middle class. During this period, some potential 
investors, local as well as non-local, have no doubt anticipated a continued 
                                                 
42 Interview, Jeffrey, Seylan Bank. 
43 Interview, Paranagama, TTA. 
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low buying power, and avoided investment in the district. As discussed in the 
previous chapter on the private sector, a low level of aggregated demand has 
probably to some extent protected from competition the local producers 
catering for the poverty market.  
 
It should be noted that depending on the product, artisans and micro-
enterprises catering for the poverty market also target other market segments. 
A case in point is the producers of foodstuffs that keep their market shares due 
to local consumer tastes. Another case is where the artisan’s products, 
although produced by low technology, are superior in terms of 
appropriateness to their use, such as the traditional curd pots. These producers 
may withstand outside competition better than, for instance, those who 
compete with imported, mass-produced plastic and metal goods. Thus, the 
lessons learned in this open economy, with no protection of the weak are: To 
survive, target niche markets, and go for the local tastes.  
 
Entrepreneurship is, in any population, a scarce resource. Moreover, there 
may be too few investment opportunities; or too slow growth in demand, 
especially in the poverty market. Alternatively, there may be enough 
investment opportunities, but not for artisans or micro-enterprises. The 
members prefer individual projects, which may also be a limitation: Maybe the 
enterprises are too small to match the opportunities when they always go for 
individual projects? The demand for bigger loans may indicate this. The 
crucial question is whether bigger loans should be given, or the industrious 
members referred to other financial institutions.  
Challenges 
The selection of produce and market and social differentiation are but two of 
the future challenges. To meet them successfully, other challenges must be 
dealt with: firstly, the questions of leadership and organisational structure.  
 
The Social Mobilisation Foundation has an institutional history; as part of 
HIRDEP, decisions regarding policy were top-down, which had to be dealt 
with during its transformation into an NGO. Its independence from 
government institutions can still, close to ten years afterwards, be questioned; 
and the implications for decision-making processes and the internal democracy 
of the organisation should be studied. In addition to the HIRDEP legacy is the 
organisational innovation during the formation of SMF, characterised by Dale 
(2002) as a lack of separation of the grassroots level and the facilities aimed at 
supporting the organisation. Dale considers this the major future challenge of 
the organisation: “Clarity about organisational structure is essential. Earlier, 
the individual Self-Banking Societies (with their constituent Groups) were 
registered voluntary organisations. What seems to have happened with the 
formation of the SMF is that the Self-Banking Societies have formally become 
sub-entities of this body. (This) is a major flaw that needs to be rectified, if 
one is ever going to pursue this thrust with any clarity of purpose and 
approach.”44  
 
                                                 
44 Interview, Dale, AIT. 
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The future profile of the organisation is in the casting ladle, and in the process, 
the distance between the grassroots and the Group members may increase. 
Increased distance is a threat to its continued existence, but if internal 
democracy is enhanced, the threat diminishes. The policy decision regarding 
the size of the loans is thus a test case. Will it continue as a combined survival 
and productive investment strategy, as a grassroots organisation for poor 
people? Or become more of a rational actor in the financial markets? Dale 
gets the final word: “I fully support a strengthened facility for promoting 
small enterprises, based on sound ethical principles and regard for 
safeguarding people’s savings. However, this must not be made the main 
thrust and responsibility of the ‘ordinary’ Social Mobilisers. The emphasis in 
social mobilisation must continue to be promotion of empowerment in a 
broad sense, with the prospect of deprived people enhancing their quality of 
life gradually – through some combination of many small trickles of mutually 
reinforcing nature (including strengthened solidarity, organisational ability, 
enhanced capacity of individuals to analyse their life situation, increased 
knowledge of many kinds). Business enterprise development must be seen as a 
supplementary flexible support mechanism, tailored to meet a variety of needs 
and in response to a variety of requests.” 45  
 
                                                 
45 Interview, Dale, AIT. 
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4 Lessons from phasing-out  
This chapter presents a summary of the team’s main findings and conclusions, 
based on the above analysis on how HIRDEP responded to its four main 
challenges in the phasing-out period: 
? How to build the capacity of the divisional level in development planning 
and management. 
? How to ensure that investments in social and economic infrastructure will 
be effectively utilised and maintained. 
? How to promote employment creation more effectively through private 
sector development. 
? How to sustain people’s organisations that strengthen poor people’s 
capabilities for income generation. 
 
We offer some suggestions as to how these lessons can be made useful in the 
future, for both development actors in Hambantota and at the national level, 
as well as for NORAD more generally. 
 
The original phasing-out principles (from 1992) emphasised the following: (i) 
that HIRDEP should gradually reduce its budgets by not taking on new public 
sector projects and limit its role as project manager; (ii) that its planning 
approach should be transferred to and operationalised at the divisional level; 
(iii) that proper operations and maintenance of HIRDEP investments should 
be ensured; (iv) that HIRDEP should endeavour to find new ways of 
enhancing users’ responsibility for public infrastructure; and (v) that it should 
experiment with new entry points for improving the economic situation of 
poor people. 
The phasing-out did not go as planned 
Compared with most aid projects the phasing-out of HIRDEP was 
exceptionally well prepared. Preparations started already seven years in 
advance, and involved careful discussions about principles and strategies. But 
following the intellectual efforts in 1992 and 1993, which produced two 
forward-looking documents (Amarasinghe nd and HIRDEP 1993), the 
phasing-out perspective seems to have been placed on the backburner as more 
immediate and pressing needs arose. HIRDEP embarked on its last phase 
much in the same manner as it had worked in the previous two phases – as a 
project implementer driven by a flexible planning process geared towards 
taking new initiatives.  
 
HIRDEP did not do things that directly contravened its original phasing-out 
principles, with one notable exception (see below), but there was at the same 
time no real monitoring of the phasing-out. There was no mechanism for this 
either within HIRDEP or at the Norwegian embassy.46 NORAD complained in 
several annual meetings about the lack of monitorable indicators regarding 
                                                 
46 Interview, Leelasena, REAP. 
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progress and achievements. “Even this year the workplan has paid very little 
attention to the review of performance of last year’s programme”.47  
 
The scaling-down of HIRDEP’s expenditure became less gradual than 
planned. If we compare actual expenditure with the budgetary forecast made 
in the 1994-99 Perspective Plan, we see that total spending ended up fairly 
close to what had been agreed in 1994 – i.e. 337 million Rs spent compared 
with 305 million planned. But if we look at the distribution over the last six 
years we see that tapering off of funds became much less gradual than 
planned. In fact, funding peaked in 1997 and then nose-dived in 1998 and 
1999 (see Figure 5). This indicates that the organisation tried to sustain a high 
level of activity as long as possible, and even as late as in 1998 we find that 
Government requested NORAD to extend its support beyond 1999.  
 
Although NORAD dictated the terms of the phasing-out it did not pursue a 
consistent policy over the period. In fact, the policy course was changed mid-
way as new political concerns were brought into the picture – especially 
private sector development. As late as 1997 the work programme underwent 
“a complete change in the orientation” (HIRDEP 1998:31). There was now a 
big push from several quarters, including NORAD, to bring employment 
creation centre stage in the programme and new activities were added, 
bringing up the budget.  
 
A completely new set of projects was added to the programme, namely the 
establishment of 21 small-scale enterprises. This turned out to be the only 
major failure in the history of HIRDEP, with all the enterprises coming to a 
closure within only a few years. The intentions were laudable – technology 
transfer and employment creation – but the strategy failed. And it is difficult 
to understand why this attempt at state-sponsored industrialisation was 
approved in the first place, as there were few reasons to believe that it would 
succeed. Adding to this, the introduction of such a demanding new approach 
at the tail end of the programme period borders on irresponsibility, even 
though the decision-makers had good reasons to trust HIRDEP’s innovative 
capacity, looking at its proven track record.  
And the context changed  
The focus of the Perspective Plan was on public sector-led activities and 
service delivery, especially at divisional level. The Local Level Planning Project 
constituted the bulk of investments. The assumption made was that the new 
local government – at divisional level – would gradually embrace the HIRDEP 
approach as the organisation built its strength. This did not happen, for 
reasons beyond the control of HIRDEP. The Pradeshiya Sabha reform of 1987 
has faltered, lacking both the required political and financial backing from the 
Parliament and the central government.  
 
It is part of the picture that HIRDEP’s phasing-out period coincided with a 
period of low economic growth and a government financial crisis, mainly as a 
                                                 
47 Royal Norwegian Embassy. ‘Comments to the Annual Workplan-HIRDEP-1999’, dated 4 
June 1998. 
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result of the war. That the District has been through a period of four years 
with below normal rainfall has placed many families under severe economic 
stress. Under such circumstances it is understandable that it has not been 
possible to maintain many HIRDEP-financed assets properly. At the same time 
it is our impression that much of the institutional capacity, built with the 
support from HIRDEP, is still in place, and can be mobilised if the conditions 
improve in the near future. 
 
Figure 5: Phasing-out: Actual and planned 
expenditures
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Lessons from public sector development 
Capacity building in public institutions could only be sustained where other 
financial resources could fill some of the vacuum after the withdrawal of 
HIRDEP. This has been a major problem at the divisional level, with activity 
levels plummeting after HIRDEP. 
 
HIRDEP invested mainly in the Divisional Secretariats, which was conducive 
to project implementation, but contributed little to the strengthening of the 
local government councils. Devoid of strong political support, the local 
government system has remained fragmented and hamstrung by political 
interference from above. In this situation HIRDEP’s vision of integrated and 
participatory planning was by and large unfeasible. The main emphasis was 
placed on so-called spot improvements – i.e. individual projects identified by 
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popular demand and individuals’ initiative rather than careful needs 
assessments.  
 
HIRDEP set new standards with respect to quality of implementation and 
professionalism in the public sector. It contributed greatly to enhancing the 
responsiveness of the public sector, although “the man in the street” tends to 
differentiate between “government” and “Norad”, the latter referring to 
HIRDEP.  
 
HIRDEP’s impact on the established public organisations is likely to be short-
lived unless the ‘collective memory’ of trained personnel is retained in 
institutionalised forms in the different agencies. The lack of a policy to retain a 
core cadre of officials with HIRDEP experience has been a problem.      
Lessons from civil society development 
Probably the most lasting impact of HIRDEP will be its efforts in institution 
building at the grassroots. The setting-up of Farmer Associations and Water 
Users Associations may be cited as examples, and there are many cases of very 
strong associations successfully attending to the operation and maintenance of 
common properties. As a result communities have been empowered to have 
confidence on their own abilities. Although recurring droughts have made 
some of them inactive, they could yet be resilient when the opportunity for 
irrigation presents itself. But even negative lessons can be valuable to 
individuals. Overall, the growth of ‘social capital’ in the District has been 
formidable over the last twenty years, and HIRDEP has been the single most 
important factor contributing to this.  
  
An aspect of the same is the forging of partnerships with local communities. 
The conventional approach to rural development has been based on the 
delivery mode and there was far too much dependence on external sources, 
whether state or donor agencies. Through its participatory planning process 
HIRDEP has been successful in entering into partnerships with local 
communities whereby a proportion of the project costs are borne by the 
beneficiaries. The practical experience of HIRDEP in this regard represents 
important local innovations that are now being emulated by NGOs as well as 
the Samurdhi movement.  
 
The growth of NGOs in the district has been commensurate with the growth 
in community-based organisations. HIRDEP has actively encouraged this 
development, not least through the Social Mobiliser programme.    
Lessons from private sector support 
A success story has been the role of HIRDEP as a midwife to the birth of 
Hambantota District Chamber of Commerce. This success was intimately 
connected with HIRDEP’s capacity for innovation and ability to act as an 
unconventional public institution. The process cannot easily be replicated, not 
least the quality of leadership in both HIRDEP and HDCC, but one general 
lesson can be drawn:  This was a process where time was a critical factor and 
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with it continuity in personal relations. The building of networks and trust 
took place over a very long period of time.  
 
We have found that HDCC needs to be more explicit about its core mandate 
and purpose as a membership organisation representing the interests of small 
and medium business in the District. This requires dealing with the following 
challenges more explicitly: (i) the development of linkages to the anticipated 
foreign investments being planned; and (ii) further development of its profile 
and commitment to corporate social responsibility regarding issues such as 
pollution, labour standards, land issues/expropriation, access to water, and 
employment creation. HDCC should be careful not to become an 
implementing outfit for a whole range of development-oriented programmes. 
It cannot replace the now defunct IRDP Project Office. In order to attract 
donor funds it is tempting to move in this direction, but clearly there is a need 
to be cautious.  
 
On the negative side, HIRDEP proved not to be an effective instrument for 
supporting infant industries. The short-lived experiment in setting up 
enterprises failed because as a public organisation HIRDEP could not provide 
the incentive structure required for effective business management. 
 
HIRDEP’s micro-credit programme, however, has hitherto been a success. 
This is now registered as a NGO – the Social Mobiliser Foundation – and a 
Banking Union. The success has first and foremost been through its broad 
membership, its outreach to poor families and the emancipating effect on its 
largely female membership. The organisation now stands at a crossroads. 
Should it continue as a grassroots organisation for poor people where social 
mobilisation remains the core mandate and micro-credit a means, or should it 
become an entrepreneur development organisation? The SMF management 
believes both can be developed as complementary activities, a strategy which 
we believe is unlikely to succeed.  
Recommendation 
Twenty years of HIRDEP has demonstrated the virtues of having a 
development catalyst at sub-national level. HIRDEP was never successful, 
partly for reasons beyond its control, in making much headway in 
comprehensive planning at district and divisional level. Although this was 
constantly referred to as a goal, its failure cannot be regarded as a big loss. 
What the District needed was an organisation with financial leverage and a 
political mandate to both stimulate and challenge the established system, and 
to develop new types of networks. That HIRDEP succeeded in this role, which 
has far from been the case with all similar aid-sponsored projects, can at least 
be attributed to the following factors: 
? A flexible planning approach 
? Lots of money 
? Close monitoring of results 
? Well qualified and committed staff 
? Continuity in management and other key staff, including within MPPI and 
NORAD 
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? Formal authority within the government structure 
? Time 
 
There is no reason to conclude that such catalytic functions are less needed 
today, although the development challenges at district, division and village 
levels have changed a lot since 1978. Most observers tend to agree that REAP 
cannot fill the vacuum left by HIRDEP, while at the same time it is unlikely 
that other programmes or donors will come forward in a similar way as 
NORAD did. The situation is made no easier with the current impasse in the 
devolution reform. This may rapidly change, however, if and when a lasting 
peace agreement with LTTE comes into place.  
 
HIRDEP will enter the annals of development aid as a successful project, and 
this evaluation contribute to this conclusion. The history of HIRDEP can tell 
us much about the commitment, the trial and errors and painstaking effort 
needed to succeed in development. There are no shortcuts and quick fixes. 
And first and foremost it is about building human and social capital.     
 
There is only one recommendation from this study that matters at this 
juncture in Sri Lanka’s history: Let the HIRDEP experience be a basis for how 
to think reconstruction and development in the war-torn parts of the island.  
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5 Annexes 
5.1 List of persons/institutions met 
Interviews 
Abewardhane, W. (Mr.) Assistant Divisional Secretary, Angunakolapelassa 
Abeysiriwardena, K.R. (Mr.) District Engineer, Provincial Irrigation Dept. 
Amaratunga, A.(Mr.) GA, Hambantota 
Ariyarathna, R. (Ms.) AGM Training, SMF 
Dale, R (Mr.) AIT 
Damika, C. (Ms.) General Manager, WDF 
Dayawathie, M.M. (Ms.) AD (Planning), Angunakolapelassa 
Ekanayake, D. (Mr.) Divisional Secretary, Katuwana 
Gajanayake, P.S. (Mr.) Former HIRDEP Project Director 
Gamage, M.P. (Mr.) Consultant 
Helbert, S.H. (Mr.) Contractor 
Hemachandra, H. (Mr.) Former HIRDEP Project Director 
Imbulgoda, H.A.S. (Mr.) Dep. Chief Secretary (Planning & Monitoring), 
Southern Province 
Jayasuriya, S. (Mr.) Board of Investment of Sri Lanka 
Jeffrey, A.R. (Mr.) Manager, Seylan Bank 
Kaluratne, G. (Mr.) Dep. Eng., Irrigation Department, Hambantota 
Kodithuwakku, G. (Ms.) AGM Enterprise, SMF 
Leelasena W.M. (Mr.) Former HIRDEP Project Director 
Mahanama, G.S. (Mr.) Trader 
Munasinghe, R (Ms.) Veterinary Surgeon, Hambantota 
Paranagama, P. (Mr.) TTA 
Pathegamage, D. (Ms.) AGM Bank, SMF 
Piyasena, M.L. (Mr.) Acting Divisional Secretary, Angunakolapelassa  
Ramanayake, B.L. (Mr.) HDCC 
Rathnayaka, W. (Mr.) ESC, HDCC 
Rohitha, D. (Mr.) AD (Planning), Katuwana 
Siripala, P.P.G. (Mr.) General Manager, SMF 
Siriwardena, T. (Mr.) Assistant Director Planning, Angunakolapelassa 
Thassim, A (Mr.) Director General, HDCC 
Wijayarupa, D.C. (Mr.) AD (Planning) Tangalle 
Wijesekara, U.S. (Mr.) Chief Residential Engineer 
 
Group meetings 
Members of  HDCC 
Social Mobilisers, SMF 
Divisional Secretaries  
SMF groups in Ambalanota 
SMF groups in Tissamaharama 
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5.2 List of HIRDEP projects in the period 1993-1999 
 
 No. Sector Project 
95-99 181 205 Project Management Planning Unit Studies 
95-99 369 205 District Training Programme 
95-99 397 205 Project Coordination and Management 
95-99 262 205 Assistance to HIRDEP 
95-99 001 308 Institutional 
development 
Staff training and technical assistance 
95-99 348 212 Environment Reforestation VI 
95-98 002 314 Fisheries Provision of services to fish sector IV 
95-96 395 314 Provision of services to fish sector III 
95-96 373 314 Kudawella settlement scheme 
95-96 373 314 Removal of harbour obstacles 
97-99 407 216 Irrigation Support to consolidation of 
rehabilitated irrigation schemes 
95-96 406 216 Improvement and rehabilitation of 
irrigation schemes II 
93-96 406 216 Improvement and rehabilitation of 
irrigation schemes III 
95-96 408 216 Lift irrigation Ranna-Wadigala 
93-95 396 216 Improvement and rehabilitation of 
irrigation schemes I 
93-96 405 216 Augmentation of Malala Ara by Mau 
Ara 
96-99 003 217 Agriculture New development of agriculture 
96-99 004 217 Livestock development 
96-99 005 220 Industrial and small 
business 
Entrepreneur development and 
infrastructure development 
95-97 006 220 Skills development 
93-95 404 220 Skills development training centre 
93-95 371 220 Vocational training I & II 
98-99 New 220 Skills development 
95-99 386 230 Settlement and 
community development 
Local level planning (in 11 divisions) 
96  230 Readware projects – Tissahamarama 
Export Village 
93-96 311 230 Maha Aluthgama settlement cluster 
96-99 375 230  Social mobilisation IV 
93-95 410 210 Water Rehabilitation of tube wells 
93-95 401 210 Beliatta water supply scheme 
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5.3 Overview of investments in physical assets  
Data compiled from HIRDEP’s Assets Registry completed 2001 
Investments '000 Rs until 1992 Investments '000 Rs 1993-99 
Name of institution 
Machinery
equipment Buildings Vehicles
Office 
equipment Sub total 
Machinery
equipment Buildings Vehicles
Office 
equipment Sub total Total
 
Divisional Secretaries and Pradeshiya Sabha  
Tangalle DS   20 20 313 605 563 575 2056 2076
Weeraketiya DS 31 1092 454 163 1740 167 51 390 608 2348
Weeraketiya PS     0  191 191 191
Lunungamvehera DS 63 544 372 198 1177  191 377 568 1745
Tissamaharama DS 40 566 434 99 1139 631  325 956 2095
Tissamaharama PS     0  192 192 192
Sooriyawewa DS 126 1198 434 175 1933 1056 224 1280 3213
Sooriyawewa PS     0  191 191 191
Okewela DS 19 1495 374 172 2060 168 410 578 2638
Hambantota DS 33 584 392 208 1217 35 885 390 1310 2527
Katuwana DS  609 394 130 1133 729 284 1013 2146
Katuwana PS     0  191 191 191
Ambalantota DS 62 752 434 210 1458 257 523 476 719 1975 3433
Ambalantota PS    25 25    0 25
Beliatta DS  1193 434 342 1969 59 335 394 2363
Beliatta PS     0  191 191 191
Weeraketiya Police     0 41  41 41
Angunokolapelasse DS 35 582 434 149 1200 40 13 255 308 1508
Angunokolapelasse PS     0  191 191 191
Tube wells - PS    134 134    0 134
Village roads - DS   101 101    0 101
 
Sub total 409 8615 4277 2005 15306 1443 4117 2390 4284 12234 27540
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Investments '000 Rs until 1992 Investments '000 Rs 1993-99 
Name of institution 
Machinery
equipment Buildings Vehicles
Office 
equipment Sub total 
Machinery
equipment Buildings Vehicles
Office 
equipment Sub total Total
            
Line agencies 
Health Department 1270 28726 1829 925 32750 4074 60 4134 36884
Agrarian Services  5970 566 427 6963    0 6963
Irrigation Department 9194 243 2099 415 11951    0 11951
Coconut Development Board 35 1421 1105 161 2722    0 2722
Water Resources Board 13852 1036 340 15228    0 15228
Forestry Department 230 515 1297 43 2085 116 199 2 5 322 2407
Livestock Department 235 1987 1518 3740    0 3740
Minor Export Crops 
Department   152 78 230    0 230
Land demarcation project   559 559    0 559
District Planning Unit     0 44  205 249 249
Water Supply and Drainage 
Board 1488 1990 31 3509 55  55 3564
Highways Department 6417 2044 13 8474    0 8474
GA Hambantota 26 948 210 1184    0 1184
Education Department  53667 451 30715 84833 7826 4229 12055 96888
 
Sub total 32747 95467 12687 33327 174228 160 12154 2 4499 16815 191043
Other public institutions 
Vocational Training Authority     0 8332 5564 1982 15878 15878
Machine Pool and Workshop  2253 873 1933 30 5089    0 5089
National Youth Service 173 1334 71 4 1582 5  68 73 1655
Middaniya Farm 37 150 14 201    0 201
Post and telecommunication  1852 269 2121    0 2121
Agriculture Insurance Board 249 301 26 576    0 576
Sericulture Bedigama 414 2846 825 87 4172    0 4172
 
Sub total 3126 7055 3399 161 13741 8337 5564 1982 68 15951 29692
C M I  
 
Investments '000 Rs until 1992 Investments '000 Rs 1993-99 
Name of institution 
Machinery
equipment Buildings Vehicles
Office 
equipment Sub total 
Machinery
equipment Buildings Vehicles
Office 
equipment Sub total Total
 
Membership organisations/cooperatives 
Handicraft Centre     0 86 229 141 456 456
Chamber of Commerce / 
Enterprise Service Centre   22 100 122 21 142 1046 1209 1331
Ruhunu Ridiyagama Agric. 
Ass.     0   54 54 54
District Fisheries Federation 7790 4298 20987 22 33097  11977 175 12152 45249
Farmer's org. - highland 
farmers   277 718 19 1014    0 1014
Tissahamarama Export 
Village     0 1315 352 158 1825 1825
Ambalantota Trade 
Association     0   23 23 23
Social Mobilisation 
Foundation     0 3739 9359 706 3222 17026 17026
Sarvodaya Sharamadana 
Sangamaya     0 498 181 679 679
Milk Cooperative Society 214 35 383 632 43   43 675
Thrift and Credit Society 
Union    134 134    0 134
Grazing Land Ass. 
Amarawewa   61 66 127    0 127
 
Sub total 8004 4610 22171 341 35126 3889 11401 13177 5000 33467 68593
Private sector / producers 
Handloom industry 499 180  679 77   77 756
Bee keeping 30   30    0 30
White fibre - choir 223 456  679    0 679
 
Sub total 752 636 0 0 1388 77 0 0 0 77 1465
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Investments '000 Rs until 1992 Investments '000 Rs 1993-99 
Name of institution 
Machinery
equipment Buildings Vehicles
Office 
equipment Sub total 
Machinery
equipment Buildings Vehicles
Office 
equipment Sub total Total
            
Village level organisation - Gramodaya Mandala 
Ethgalmulla 5 77 33 115    0 115
Okandayaya  22  22    0 22
Welandagoda 12   12    0 12
Bandagiriya  8 3 11    0 11
Bundala 1  1 2    0 2
Siyarapitiya 5   5    0 5
Handugala 3   3    0 3
Wauwa 1   1    0 1
Galpothayaya    0 0    0 0
Medamulana    0 0    0 0
Bowala    0 0    0 0
Kanumuldeniya    0 0    0 0
Omara    0 0    0 0
Yakkgahamulla    35 35    0 35
 
Sub total 27 107 0 72 206 0 0 0 0 0 206
 
 
IRDP Office + Various minor support to organisations 
"Project Coordination" 1008 8849 8459 1871 20187 0 0 2397 2701 5098 25285
            
            
Grand total 45065 116490 42534 35906 239995 13906 33236 17551 13851 78544 318539
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Summary 
 
Aid has been successful when it is no longer needed, but we all too 
often see how aid breeds dependency, and how both donors and 
recipients have difficulties preparing for termination of the 
relationship. This is a study of a case of planned phasing-out. 
Commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD) and the Ministry of Southern Area 
Development, Government of Sri Lanka, it summarises the main 
experiences and lessons from twenty years of cooperation in the 
Hambantota District with a focus on the last phase from 1992 to 
1999.   
 The study looks at two broad themes. Firstly, how were the 
achievements of HIRDEP in building a more responsive public sector 
sustained within a changing government structure? And secondly, 
how did HIRDEP contribute to the new policies of the 1990s of 
strengthening economic growth, and, in particular, promote 
institutions able to create economic opportunities for the poor?  
 The phasing-out did not go as initially planned. The scaling-
down of HIRDEP’s expenditure was not gradual. It first peaked and 
then nose-dived, which indicate that the HIRDEP-organisation tried 
to sustain a high level of activity as long as possible. Moreover, 
NORAD changed the policy course mid-way as new political 
concerns were brought into the picture – especially private sector 
development. 
 With the faltering local government reform, it turned out that 
the new divisions were not capable of replicating and sustaining the 
development approaches pioneered by HIRDEP.  In general, capacity 
building in public institutions could only be sustained where other 
financial resources filled some of the vacuum after the withdrawal of 
HIRDEP. 
 Probably the most lasting impact of HIRDEP will be its 
efforts in institution building at the grassroots, related to micro-
credit and the management of local infrastructure – irrigation, 
drinking water supply, community centres etc. HIRDEP’s attempt to 
establish new small-scale industries, by-and-large, failed, while its 
role as a midwife to the birth of Hambantota District Chamber of 
Commerce is a remarkable success. 
 Twenty years of HIRDEP has demonstrated the virtues of 
having a development catalyst at sub-national level, and the authors 
make a strong plea for making use of this experience when, at this 
juncture, government and donors are preparing for reconstruction 
and development in the war-torn parts of the island.  
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